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ABSTRACT 
The dissertation investigates whether virtue ethics can provide the normative 
ground for the justification of rights. Most justificatory accounts of rights consist 
in different explanations of the function(s) of rights. On the view I will defend, 
rights have a plurality of functions and one of the main functions of rights is to 
make the right-holder more virtuous. The idea that the possession of rights leads 
to the development of virtues, called the function of virtue acquisition, is the 
core of a virtue-based justification of rights elaborated in this dissertation. Based 
on Leif Wenar’s Kind-Desire Theory of rights and Nancy E. Snow’s Minimal Virtue 
of the Folk, I argue that there are two general types of rights, enabling rights and 
protective rights, and that both types are essential to the development of virtues. 
Enabling rights have the function of virtue acquisition because they allow the 
right-holder to strive for approximation of ideal role models while performing 
duties and other tasks. Such models are called heuristic models of virtues for they 
define what virtues are and how these virtues should be expressed in action. Some 
protective rights, namely promissory rights and the power-right to promise, 
behave like enabling rights when it comes to their ability to develop virtues. Other 
protective rights, especially children’s rights, make right-holders more virtues via 
protecting their essential needs. The dissertation succeeds in elaborating the 
virtue-based justification of many rights, hence it suggests that people hold and 
should have rights because rights make them better people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate whether virtue ethics can serve as 
the normative ground for the justification of rights. Most justificatory accounts of 
rights consist in different explanations of the function(s) of rights. On the view I 
will defend, rights have a plurality of functions and one of the main functions of 
rights is to make the right-holder more virtuous. The idea that the possession of 
rights leads to the development of virtues, which I will call the function of virtue 
acquisition, is the core of a virtue-based justification of rights elaborated here, 
and therefore central to the dissertation. 
The origins of our modern understanding of rights can be traced back to the 
Middle Ages (Brett 1997), though the intense conceptual re-shaping of this 
understanding started with the works of Grotius, Hobbes and Locke in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who considered rights as powers and 
immunities assigned to individuals by nature and/or the state (Finnis 1980, 
Schneewind 1998). Such a conceptual framework was once again re-developed by 
Jeremy Bentham (1789/1996) and Immanuel Kant (1797/1996) in the eighteenth 
century and later by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1913), from whom most, if not 
all, contemporary scholars learn to comprehend what rights are (Hart 1983, Wenar 
2008). 
Perhaps because of this history of the modern concept of a right, all the 
ongoing philosophical discussions about rights line up with deontology and 
consequentialism, two normative theories that dominated modern moral 
philosophy. More precisely, the modern idea of rights seems to have been crucially 
influenced by a Kantian moral philosophy (the best-known instance of deontology) 
and the first utilitarians (proponents of an instance of consequentialism), such as 
Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill. Their influence is still clearly visible today, though 
most contemporary theorists ground rights in deontology rather than 
consequentialism.  
In the second half of the twentieth century, Elisabeth Anscombe (1958) 
famously challenged the both predominant normative theories and proposed a 
return to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. To the best of my knowledge, no modern scholar 
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has attempted to justify rights from a virtue ethicist’s standpoint.1 The reason 
why theorists have overlooked virtue ethics whilst searching for the justification 
of rights might be found in the distinctiveness of this rather ancient normative 
theory. While both deontology and consequentialism are characterised as theories 
dealing with ‘act-centred’ morality that answers the question ‘What is the right 
thing to do?’, virtue ethics is usually explained as an ‘agent-centred’ theory of 
moral character, aiming to answer questions such as ‘What sort of person should 
I be?’ and ‘How should I live?’ (Crisp 1996, Schneewind 1990). Accordingly, it may 
seem quite natural to conclude that virtue ethics does not have much to say about 
rights because both the language of rights and the function(s) of rights are thought 
to be concerned with guiding human action and/or providing people with a 
restricted scope for their actions, that is, with liberty or freedom.2 Therefore, 
rights may seem to go hand in hand with act-centred normative theories that 
concern the question of rightness and wrongness of action, rather than agent-
based theories of goodness and badness of moral character. This dissertation 
disproves that assertation. As will be argued, many characteristic features of 
virtue ethics are not only compatible with the modern concept of a right, but also 
                                         
1 Some scholars have recently started to search for possible connections between 
virtues and other legal concepts. Edmundson (2006) focuses on virtuous political 
and legal obedience. Gardner (2000), on the other hand, investigates whether the 
virtue of justice is the right aspiration for the law. Cimino (2010), furthermore, 
grounds the fundamental principles of the contract law in virtue ethics but does not 
pay any attention to the question of what virtues can tell us about contractual 
rights. Brownlee (2015), finally, illustrates that the law can function as a model of 
virtue and that citizens can develop virtues by emulating this model. I have drawn 
inspiration form Brownlee’s work. However, she is sceptical about connecting 
virtues and rights. Rights, as she points out, can only lead to ‘respecting people’s 
rights and demanding that they fulfil their duties instead of adopting the more 
sensitive, flexible approaches recommended by virtue ethics’ (Brownlee 2015: 13). 
Furthermore, she argues that we can reasonably expect only some ‘moral minimum’ 
when it comes to respecting other people’s rights and demanding their 
performances of duties. Hence, the law cannot enforce some higher moral standards 
of respecting and performing. As will be argued in this dissertation, the law does 
not need to enforce such higher standards so that rights can lead to the 
development of virtues. For these higher standards come with people’s motivations 
to exercise rights in certain ways in order to perfect their social roles.      
2 Liberty and freedom are used interchangeably in the dissertation. 
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reveal some unexplored aspects of rights, such as their ability to make us better 
people in general.  
The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part One demonstrates that the 
modern concept of a right is compatible with the idea of virtue acquisition, and 
that many rights which are derived from social roles we occupy in our everyday 
life are necessary for the development of virtues. In Part Two, I elaborate the 
virtue-based justification of children’s rights and promissory rights, that is, rights 
which are the paradigmatic counterexamples to the two prevailing theories of 
rights, the Will Theory and the Interest Theory.  
To be more specific, Chapter I. introduces a theoretical background of 
current philosophical discussions about the nature and justification of rights. 
Based on Leif Wenar’s (2005, 2013) work, I argue that rights have more than only 
one function (Wenar’s Several-Functions Theory) and that rights are ascribed to 
social roles and natural kinds (species) rather than individuals (Wenar’s Kind-
Desire Theory). I use Wenar’s Kind-Desire Theory as the descriptive account of 
rights throughout this dissertation.  
Chapter II. concerns virtues. There are two main interpretations of virtues. 
According to one explanation, virtues are acquired character traits and qualities, 
partly constituted by virtuous motives and expressed in action. The other account 
takes virtues to be any qualities that reliably lead to good ends or consequences. 
I propose the working definition of virtues that combines the core principles 
(virtuous motives and reliability) of those two main accounts. Since I aim to 
illustrate that the possession of rights results in the development of virtues, the 
question about how such virtues are acquired is essential to my argument. 
Consequently, I present Nancy E. Snow’s (2016) explanation of virtue acquisition, 
the Minimal Virtue of the Folk, according to which people can and often do 
develop virtues through perfecting their social roles. 
Chapter III. connects the concept of a right with the idea of virtue 
development via the realm of social roles, as well as demonstrates that at least 
some role-based rights, namely enabling rights, have the function of virtue 
acquisition. In principle, role-based enabling rights permit the development of 
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virtues through perfecting social roles since they allow their holders to strive for 
approximating ideal role models whilst performing role-based duties, activities 
and ends. Such ideal role models, the heuristic models of virtues, define what 
virtues are and how they should be expressed in action 
Chapter IV. illustrates how virtue ethics justifies the rights of children. 
Children, I believe, have at least three fundamental rights, the right not to be 
harmed, neglected and abused, the right to be nurtured, cared for and loved, and 
the right to education. Unlike enabling rights, these rights exist primarily to 
protect children’s essential needs. I argue that by protecting such needs, the three 
fundamental rights secure children’s healthy mental and physical development, 
which, in turn, protects and furthers children’s capacity for virtue acquisition. 
Despite the fact that everyone holds this capacity, its scope depends, to a large 
degree, on one’s mental and physical health. Furthermore, although the capacity 
for virtue acquisition develops throughout our lives, I believe that the most crucial 
stages of this development occur in childhood. Therefore, the protection of 
children’s essential needs makes children more virtuous throughout their lives. 
Chapter V., the last chapter of this dissertation, inquires into the practice 
of promising to illustrate that the power-right to promise (i.e., our ability to make 
promises) and promissory rights have the function of virtue acquisition. I argue 
that anyone who participates in promising has a moral duty to achieve at least the 
minimal standards of honesty and fairness, for the duty comes with the roles of a 
promisor and a promisee. This duty-ascription permits the perfection of the two 
roles, which then allows the development of honesty and fairness. To perfect the 
roles of a promisor and a promisee, individuals must exercise their power-right to 
promise and promissory rights in certain (correct) ways. Thus, these rights make 
the development of honesty and fairness possible. Put differently, the function of 
virtue acquisition here is explained by the Minimal Virtue of the Folk and the 
heuristic model of virtues. The chapter demonstrates that many people are 
motivated (either indirectly or directly) to perfect their roles of a promisor and a 
promisee, implying that many people will eventually acquire certain standards of 
honesty and fairness. 
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Finally, it is also important to highlight the limits of my work. First and 
foremost, albeit I am inclined to think that the function of virtue acquisition can 
be found in all types of rights, I concentrate only on the so-called ‘claim-rights’ 
and one ‘power-right’. Other types of rights, such as privilege-rights, immunity-
rights and other power-rights, are passed over, partly because of availability of 
space, and partly since claim-rights are the paradigm rights of human conduct, 
making up many essential rights people hold. Second, I have no intention to depict 
virtue ethics as a better normative theory for the justification of rights when 
compared with deontology and consequentialism. The aim of this dissertation is 
to investigate whether virtue ethics can justify rights, not whether this 
justification is better than others. Third, my work neither explains nor vindicates 
any meta-ethical position. Given that the dissertation is concerned with the 
normative aspects of rights, I leave open the meta-ethical implications of the 
virtue-based justification of rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PART ONE 
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CHAPTER I. RIGHTS 
1. Philosophical discussions about rights 
Most modern scholars researching into rights have both analysed logical links 
between rights and other legal concepts, such as ‘powers’, ‘immunities’, ‘claims’, 
and ‘duties’, and attempted to explain their normative and perhaps meta-ethical 
foundations (Waldron 1984). As will be illustrated in this chapter, most 
explications of what rights are (i.e., descriptive accounts of rights) have been 
derived from distinct explanations of what rights there are (i.e., justificatory 
accounts of rights). Such justificatory accounts can be regarded as different 
explanations of the function(s) of rights. The chapter aims to demonstrate that 
rights have more than one function, and that they are ascribed to social roles and 
natural kinds (such as human beings and animals) rather than individuals.   
 For any contemporary theorist who is concerned with a descriptive account 
(conceptual analysis) of rights, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-1918) is in many 
ways like Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) for those who inquire into the philosophy of 
language. Both Hohfeld and Frege came up with ideas that are currently 
considered as the fundamental starting point for anyone who is interested in the 
nature of rights and the nature of language, respectively.3 In his article, ‘Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913), Hohfeld 
investigated and clarified ‘fundamental legal relations’ consisting of ‘jural 
opposites’ and ‘jural correlatives’ of eight fundamental legal concepts: rights, 
duties, privileges, no-rights, powers, liabilities, immunities and disabilities. In 
other words, Hohfeld devised the descriptive framework of complex internal 
structures of these legal concepts, and therefore he is rightly considered to be 
the father of a modern conceptual analysis of rights.  
Although Hohfeld’s analysis is, as Leif Wenar points out, ‘by far the most 
widely accepted analysis of the logical structure of rights’ (Wenar 2008: 253), 
                                         
3 Compere books that aim to introduce the philosophy of language, such as, (Miller 
2007), (Kemp 2013) and (McGinn 2015), with those that provide the introduction to 
theories of rights, for instance, (Waldron 1984), (Thomson 1990) and (Wenar 2015).  
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there is a vocal disagreement about the ‘strict’ definition of what rights are. Some 
theorists insist on Hohfeld’s (1913: 32) assertion that the world ‘claim’ is the best 
synonym for the notion ‘right’, and therefore, in the ‘strictest sense’, all rights 
are claims (see, e.g., Feinberg 1970, Kramer 1998). Others argue that all rights 
are paired-privileges and powers providing their holders with choices or discretion 
(see, e.g., Hart 1983, Steiner 1998).4 However, the assertations that rights are 
either claims or paired-privileges and powers seem implausible, for we have other 
types of rights too.5 Suppose that you have been invited to deliver a lecture at 
Charles University in Prague. By accepting the invitation, you obtain the right to 
deliver the lecture. Yet, this right is neither a paired-privilege right nor a power-
right nor a claim-right. The right you have is a single-privilege right, meaning that 
you have no duty not to deliver the lecture, but, at the same time, you are held 
under the duty to deliver it. 
Given the implausibility of the statements that rights are either claims or 
paired-privileges and powers, others (Wenar 2005, 2008, 2015) have argued that 
rights are, in fact, one or a mixture of four essential Hohfeldian elements, 
privileges, claims, powers, and immunities, defined as follows:  
▪ Privilege-rights: X has a privilege-right to  if and only if X has no 
duty not to . 
▪ Claim-rights: X has a claim-right that Y  if and only if Y has a duty 
to X that . 
▪ Power-rights: X has a power-right if and only if X has an ability to 
alter some other Hohfeldian element. 
                                         
4 To have a paired-privilege means to have both no duty not to  and no duty to . 
(Unless otherwise stated,  stands for some action or refraining from some action). 
To have a single-privilege, on the other hand, means to have only no duty not to . 
According to Wenar, the main difference between paired-privilege and single 
privilege rights is in their functions. While the function of single-privilege rights is 
to confer an exemption from a general duty (e.g., a duty not to kill), the function 
of paired-privilege rights is not necessarily to confer such an exemption, but to 
provide the right-holder with discretion concerning  (Wenar 2005: 227-228).   
5 It is true that claim-rights, paired-privilege rights and power-rights make up many 
important moral and legal rights, such as citizens’ right not to be assaulted and 
children’s right to education (claim-rights), rights of free speech and freedom of 
religion (paired-privilege rights), and rights to give consent and make promises 
(power-rights). 
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▪ Immunity-rights: X has an immunity-right if and only if Y lacks an 
ability to alter X’s Hohfeldian element. 
These rights are then divided into ‘first-order’ rights (privilege-rights and claim-
rights) and ‘second-order’ rights (power-rights and immunity-rights). First-order 
rights concern directly people’s conduct, for they permit, require and forbid 
action. While a firing squad, to use Wenar’s (2005) examples, has a privilege-right 
to kill, which exempts the firing squad from the general duty not to kill (permitting 
action), a promisee has a claim-right that the promisor fulfils the promissory duty 
(requiring action, namely the performance of the promised action, and forbidding 
actions conflicting with the promised action). On the other hand, second-order 
rights are concerned directly with the first-order rights, since they introduce, 
change and cancel privilege-rights and claim-rights. To give you consent to enter 
my house, which is the power-right derived from my ownership of that building, 
is to waive my claim-right that you do not enter the house. This ownership also 
provides me with the immunity-right that others cannot waive, annul or transfer 
my aforementioned power-right and claim-right. 
 In fact, property rights are an excellent instance of the so-called ‘molecular 
rights’, that is, rights consisting of more than only one Hohfeldian element, 
because they include all four essential elements. As has been said, my ownership 
of the house contains the power-right enabling me to waive the claim-right, also 
derived from this ownership, that others do not enter the house. Since I can 
transfer the whole molecular right to someone else by selling the house, the 
second-order rights are able to change and cancel themselves as well. 
Furthermore, my property right includes the privilege-right allowing me to enter 
and live in the house. Finally, my ownership comes with the immunity-right which 
disables other people to alter any aspect of my property right, that is, my 
privilege-right, claim-right and power-right.6 Another example of a molecular 
right is the right to religious freedom. This right is both an immunity-right, for it 
                                         
6 Note that someone might have a power-right to waive, annul or transfer other 
people’s second-order rights. Accordingly, when I keep failing to pay my debts, the 
court of law may issue a writ of fieri facias which authorises someone else, an 
execution creditor, to take my property and thereby annul my molecular property 
right.  
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protects my ability to choose whether and which religion to practise, and a paired-
privilege right, because it provides me with this capacity to choose. Given that 
most modern rights have such complex (molecular) structures, Wenar (2005, 2015) 
seems to be correct in claiming that rights are either one or a mixture of the four 
Hohfeldian elements, and not merely claims or paired-privileges and powers.  
 When it comes to the normative debate about rights (different justificatory 
accounts of rights), the main disagreement is, in principle, about the function(s) 
of rights. Most philosophers participating in this debate have attempted to explain 
what rights there are (i.e., rights-ascriptions) by identifying what rights do for 
the right-holder, as well as to justify the existence of rights as such by explicating 
why people need rights at all. For the sake of clarity, let me divide the debate 
into two sub-discussions, though, as will be illustrated later, the dividing line 
between the two is often blurred. 
 The first sub-discussion can be regarded as a micro perspective on the 
function of rights, because it concerns the question about what rights do for their 
individual holders. The Will Theory and the Interest Theory are the most 
prominent accounts here. While the proponents of the Will Theory (e.g., Hart, 
1955, 1983, Steiner 1998) argue that rights provide the right-holder with choices 
or deliberation seen as liberty, the advocates of the Interest Theory (e.g., 
Bentham 1789/1996, Lyons 1970, 1984, MacCormick 1982, Raz 1988, Kramer 1998) 
maintain that rights protect and further the right-holder’s interests understood as 
well-being or welfare. A promissory right is the typical exemplar of a right for the 
Will Theory, because it provides the promisee with an option to either waive or 
enforce the performance of the promised action. Property rights, on the other 
hand, are the representative instance of a right for the Interest Theory, since they 
protect and further the owner’s interests in ownership. Note that not all interests 
someone might have can serve as ‘sufficient reasons’ for holding another person 
to be under a duty. Only those interests that are essential to one’s well-being or 
welfare (e.g., ownership) provide such normative grounds (MacCormick 1982, Raz 
1988).  
The second sub-discussion can be seen as a macro perspective on the 
function of rights, for its central question is why people need rights at all. Any 
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answer to this question is meant to justify the existence of rights in the society. 
There are, roughly speaking, two main approaches to the subject matter, called 
‘Duty-Based’ or ‘Status’ theories and ‘Goal-Based’ or ‘Instrument’ theories 
(Dworkin 1978, Wenar 2015).  
Duty-Based (Status) theories work on the assumption that rights are entirely 
based on or derived from people’s status. Though the concept of status might be 
understood in different ways, the most common way is to interpret it as human 
dignity. Since human dignity is both unwaivable and unalienated, nobody can ever 
be justified in violating another person’s rights. According to Nozick (1978), 
perhaps the best-known defender of this justificatory account, rights are ‘side 
constraints’ on the pursuit of good consequences. Grounded in a deontological 
comprehension of human dignity, such side constraints exist to protect individuals 
against the so-called ‘utilitarianism of rights’, the claim that there might be 
circumstances, such as avoiding some terrifying harm, in which people are 
justified in infringing individuals’ rights (Nozick 1978). 
Goal-Based (Instrument) theories, on the other hand, take rights to be 
instruments for achieving some optimal distribution (maximisation, equality, etc.) 
of advantages (utility, capabilities, resources, etc.) (Wenar 2015). The advocates 
of this approach argue that there might be situations in which the infringement of 
someone’s rights is the only right (hence justified) action. Thomson (1990), for 
instance, comes up with the idea of threshold rights, according to which one is 
justified in overriding some other right if and only if the actual infringement brings 
about some significant amount of good. Goal-Based theories are often, though not 
necessarily, grounded in consequentialism. Accordingly, maximising good 
consequences, such as killing one innocent to save the lives of five, is one of the 
most widely accepted ways to determine when it is right to override someone 
else’s rights (e.g., the rights of the innocent person). 
The dividing line between those two sub-discussions is usually blurred 
because most philosophers often intermingle their micro-perspective accounts 
with their macro-perspective explanations of the function(s) of rights. This medley 
has two implications. Firstly, philosophers can have the same micro perspective 
while defending different macro-perspective accounts. For instance, first 
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utilitarians considered rights as instruments for maximising utility in the society 
(the Goal-Based Theory), and from this they inferred that rights benefit their 
holders (the Interest Theory) (Bentham 1789/1996). However, more recent 
Interest theorists (MacCormick 1982, Raz 1988, Kramer 1998) assert that rights 
protect and further people’s well-being, and they seem to interpret the concept 
of well-being as the deontological notion of human dignity (the Duty-Based 
Theory). Secondly, philosophers can argue for the same macro perspective while 
holding different micro-perspective accounts. Some Will theorists (Hart 1955) 
argue that all rights are derived from an agent’s status comprehended as 
autonomy (the Duty-Based Theory). Accordingly, such Will theorists share the 
same macro-perspective account with some Interest theorists but disagree about 
their micro-perspective views of the function of rights.   
Furthermore, many philosophers often base their descriptive accounts of 
rights on their justificatory accounts. It is not a coincidence that the Will Theory 
and the Interest Theory have been also the two most prevailing descriptive 
accounts of rights. Most Will theorists maintain that only those Hohfeldian 
elements that give us the discretionary control (i.e., paired-privileges and powers) 
can be truly seen as rights. On the other hand, Interest theorists argue that rights 
are only those elements that protect and further our well-being or welfare (i.e., 
claims and perhaps immunities). Put differently, the proponents of the both 
theories explain what rights are in accordance with their views of what rights do 
for their holders (the micro perspective on the function of rights). This implies 
that whenever some Hohfeldian element fails to function in such ways, it is not 
(and should not be called) a right (see, e.g., Wenar 2008: 253-267). 
Despite the differences between the Will and Interest Theories, they share 
the assumption that rights have only one (micro-perspective) function. In his work, 
Leif Wenar (2005, 2008, 2015) has challenged this assumption and argued that it 
is the main disadvantage of the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, for it leads 
to long-recognised counterexamples. These counterexamples reside in the 
theorist’s inability to describe certain uncontroversial rights people hold. Will 
theorists, as will be illustrated in Chapter IV., cannot explain unwaivable rights 
(e.g., most children’s rights and citizens’ right not to be assaulted), because these 
rights do not provide the right-holder with an option to waive them. Interest 
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theorists, on the other hand, have had difficulties with describing, inter alia, the 
possession of rights that cannot be justified by individuals’ interests. This inability 
precludes the Interest theorist from explaining most rights that come with social 
roles, such as journalists’ right to protect their sources, police officers’ rights to 
stop and search people, judges’ right to sentence criminals, etc. As Wenar points 
out: 
‘Whatever interest a judge may have in exercising her legal right to 
sentence a convict to life in prison, the judge's interests cannot possibly 
justify ascribing to her the power to make such a dramatic change in 
the convict's normative situation.’ (Wenar 2015) 
Contrary to the assertion that rights have only one function, Wenar (2005) 
claims that rights have several functions, determining which Hohfeldian essential 
elements or which combinations of such elements are rights. In other words, 
Wenar, like other scholars, maintain that while all rights are Hohfeldian elements, 
only some Hohfeldian elements can be rights. To qualify as a right, these essential 
Hohfeldian elements (privileges, claims, powers, and immunities) must have at 
least one of the six following functions: 
▪ Exemption (single privilege-rights)  
▪ Discretion (paired-privilege rights and paired power-rights) 
▪ Authorization (power-rights) 
▪ Protection (immunity-rights and claim-rights) 
▪ Provision (claim-rights)  
▪ Performance (claim-rights and immunity rights)  
This Several-Functions Theory seems to reflect, in a simple and elegant way, the 
complex molecular structure of most modern rights. Perhaps more importantly, 
Wenar’s rejection of the ‘monistic’ view of the function of rights appears to avoid 
most, if not all, long-recognised counterexamples (see, e.g., Wenar 2005: 246-
251). Consequently, I believe that Wenar’s Several-Functions Theory provides a 
more accurate micro-perspective account than the Will Theory and the Interest 
Theory, and therefore I accept the conclusion that rights have a plurality of 
functions. 
 I have no intention to list all the possible functions of rights, nor do I plan 
to justify Wenar’s six specific functions here. As mentioned in the introduction, 
the aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate that one of the main functions of 
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rights is to make the right-holder more virtuous (the function of virtue 
acquisition). Before elaborating the virtue-based justification of rights, I also need 
to explain the descriptive account of rights, the Kind-Desire Theory, which will be 
used throughout this dissertation.  
The Kind-Desire Theory is Wenar’s (2013) analysis of the nature of claim-
rights. It serves as the descriptive account here for three reasons. First, this 
dissertation is concerned primarily with the virtue-based justification of claim-
rights. (It should be pointed out that most claim-rights are in fact molecular rights, 
and therefore many rights discussed in the dissertation are also other types of 
rights.) Second, Wenar’s analysis is normatively impartial. Put differently, it does 
not presuppose any justificatory account of rights, and it can be used to describe 
any system of norms classifying its entities:   
‘The analysis carries no commitments regarding the justification of 
rights, or regarding the conceptual priority of duties or rights. The 
analysis says nothing about the force of rights: whether moral rights are 
“side-constrains” or whether legal rights are “trumps” are questions for 
moral and legal theory. Nor, most importantly, does the analysis say 
what duties or rights really exist. [The Kind-Desire] theory is an analysis 
of what rights are, not of what rights there are.’ (Wenar 2013: 209-210) 
It follows that Wenar’s description of rights is not grounded in deontology or 
consequentialism at all. This impartiality allows me to employ the characteristic 
features of virtue ethics whilst justifying specific rights-ascriptions.7  Third, the 
Kind-Desire Theory ascribes rights to social roles and natural kinds (e.g., humans 
and animals) rather than individual beings. As will be argued in the subsequent 
chapters, people can develop virtues through perfecting their social roles and 
humanity, and rights are essential to virtue acquisition for they permit this 
perfection. Wenar’s Kind-Desire Theory, in other words, prepares the way for 
connecting the concept of rights with the idea of virtue acquisition.         
                                         
7 I believe that the virtue-based justification would work with any non-normative 
descriptive account of rights. Since Wenar’s analysis is, as far as I know, the only 
normatively impartial description of claim-rights available, I have no option but to 
use it as the descriptive account. 
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2. The Kind-Desire Theory of claim-rights 
The Kind-Desire Theory, which is derived from Wenar’s (2013) Social-Role Theory, 
ascribes claim-rights and duties directly to social roles and natural kinds (species). 
The analysis explains such ascriptions on the basis of the precise identification of 
role/kind-based desires: 
‘Consider a system of norms S that refers to entities under descriptions 
that are kinds [or roles], D and R. If and only if, in circumstances C, a 
norm of S supports statements of the form: 
1. Some D (qua D) has a duty to phi some R (qua R); where “phi” 
is a verb phrase specifying an action, such as “pay benefits to,” 
“refrain from touching,” “shoot,” and so on. 
2. Rs (qua Rs) want such duties to be fulfilled; and 
3. Enforcement of this duty is appropriate, ceteris paribus; 
then: the R has a claim-right in S that the D fulfil this duty in 
circumstances C.’ (Wenar 2013: 219)   
Both the Kind-Desire Theory and the Social-Role Theory are formally and 
functionally identical. The only difference, as Wenar clarifies, lies in their scope. 
Since we do not consider human beings and animals as roles, the term ‘role’ is no 
longer sufficient for an analysis of rights. To include human and animal rights in 
his analysis, Wenar proposes a new term, a ‘kind’ (genus in Latin), which is broad 
enough to accommodate also humans and animals. Accordingly, parents, for 
instance, are members of both a natural kind (human being) and a social kind 
(parent). Although I adopt Wenar’s ‘natural kind’ when referring to species, I am 
going to use the term ‘social role’ instead of his ‘social kind’. 
The Kind-Desire Theory is an analysis of claim-rights. As has been defined 
above, someone, X, has a claim-right that someone else, Y, (not)  if and only if 
Y has a duty to X (not) to . Claim-rights, in other words, always correlate with 
duties (though some duties need not correlate with claim-rights). Any ascription 
of some right or duty, on Wenar’s account, is based on the precise identification 
of role/kind-based desires. In principle, all social roles and natural kinds contain 
one of the two essential desires: (1) the desire to perform role/kind-based duties 
implying another desire to hold rights enabling this performance, and (2) the 
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desire that certain duties are fulfilled by others, which implies another desire to 
hold rights securing these fulfilments. 
The first type of desire is pinpointed by the so-called ‘duty-derived 
attributions of desires’. Many social roles and presumably some natural kinds are, 
to a large extent, defined by duties they contain. To give an example, consider 
the role of a bartender. To be a bartender means to serve customers at the bar. 
Since this role is essentially defined by its duty to serve customers at the bar, the 
duty also identifies the role-based desire. Thus, any individual occupying the role 
of a bartender desires to serve customers at the bar. Note that Wenar’s concept 
of desire does not refer to individual persons’ psychological states, though people 
can identify with such desires. Accordingly, John, qua bartender, desires to serve 
customers at the bar, even though he, qua John (an individual person), does not 
wish to do so at all. 
The identification of this type of desire also explains relevant rights-
ascriptions. Parents, qua parents, desire to look after their children, for that is, 
arguably, their most important role-based duty. Since most rights held by parents 
exist to enable them to perform their parental duties and activities, the duty to 
care for children clarifies why parents desire to have such rights (e.g., rights to 
child benefits and to make decisions about raising children). Furthermore, given 
that many parental duties are enforced by the existing system of norms, those 
duties explicate why children have correlative claim-rights (e.g., the right that 
parents look after them).  
Role/kind-normative attributions of desires identify the second type of 
desire. The difference between these and duty-derived attributions lies in a ‘duty 
loss’ (Wenar 2013). There are social roles and natural kinds which contain desires 
that certain duties are fulfilled by other people. Such desires simply come with 
roles and kinds as their norms. The role of a promisee, to use Wenar’s (2013) 
example, has the role-based desire that promisors fulfil their duties to keep 
promises. Unlike role-based desires in the roles of a bartender and a parent, the 
promisee’s desire is not pinpointed by some duty the promisee, qua promisee, 
must carry out. Since the concept of desire does not refer to our psychological 
states, our individual interests in the performance of the duty, and hence in 
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possessing promissory rights, are irrelevant here.8 Therefore, promissory rights 
are ascribed to the role of a promisee in accordance with its (role-based) desire 
that promisors fulfil their promissory duties. As Wenar (2013) argues, so long as 
this desire is recognised and protected as a role-norm by the system of norms, the 
system enforces the performance of promissory duties and hence assigns 
promissory rights to the role of a promisee. 
Role/kind-normative attributions of desires seem unquestionable when 
considering promissory rights, for promises are commonly regarded as the 
normative and conceptual basis for the contract law (Hogg 2011). Consequently, 
promissory rights, together with the role-norm generating the role-based desire 
that promisors fulfil their promissory duties, are recognised in many moral and 
legal systems all over the world.  
Yet, role/kind-normative attributions of desire can become problematic 
when it comes to other social roles and natural kinds. For people can be uncertain 
about pinpointing role-norms and kind-norms, and therefore they might have 
dilemmas regarding how some desires and rights should be assigned to certain 
roles and kinds. This, in turn, can easily result in disagreements about whether 
these roles and kinds contain such desires, or whether these desires should be 
protected by rights. Since Wenar’s analysis does not tell what the justification of 
rights is, it cannot tell us what to do when we have such dilemmas.  
To illustrate how role/kind-normative attributions of desire can lead to these 
disagreements, think about the role of a child. Children, on Wenar’s account, are 
members of a social role (children) and a natural kind (human being). What 
                                         
8 Suppose that you promised me to pay back the money I had lent you a week ago 
by this Friday. The fact that I intend to use the money for taking my children to the 
Zoo this weekend neither explains nor justifies my desire, qua promisee, to hold 
the promissory right that you pay the money back by this Friday. My intention to 
take children to the Zoo comes from my role of a parent, and therefore it is part of 
my role-based desire to perform my parental duties. Since the Kind-Desire Theory 
ascribes rights in accordance with role-based desires which do not depend on 
individuals’ psychological states, it explains how different people with different 
interests in the performance of the promised action can hold promissory rights 
without the need for stipulating which individual interests justify such rights-
ascriptions. 
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role/kind-norms does the role of a child contain? Consider children’s status as a 
human being. Do children, qua human being, hold the basic human right of self-
determination, from which most liberty rights, such as rights to have sex, to 
marry, to practise religion, etc., are derived? It is not clear at all whether 
children, qua children, desire to be authorised to do such things, nor is it 
uncontroversial to claim that children should have those liberty rights. It follows 
that we are uncertain of children’s possession of the human right of self-
determination (see, e.g., Archard 2014). In fact, we cannot answer the question 
of what rights children have unless we justify our (often different) explanations 
of what children, qua children and human beings, desire, and why such desires 
should be protected by rights. The point is that any offered explanation of some 
role/kind-based desire in this case is derived from our understanding of the role-
norms we associate with the role of a child. 
Whenever we have dilemmas regarding how some desires and rights should 
be assigned in problematic cases, such as children, human beings and animals, any 
successful justification of these ascriptions must be derived from and mirror the 
prevailing moral convictions in the society. Wenar is aware of this:    
‘Kind-desire analysis predicts that our confidence in our ascriptions of 
human rights will track our confidence in these desire-attributions. 
Where we are more confident about what humans as such want, we 
should be more confident about their rights; and where we are less 
confident, the rights should appear less certain.’ (Wenar 2013: 225) 
Accordingly, even though Wenar’s analysis claims to be normatively impartial, we 
must take sides, that is, employ normative theories when discussing many rights-
ascriptions based on role/kind-normative attributions of desires. More precisely, 
the Kind-Desire Theory cannot be used to find out what rights there are unless we 
know either which system of norms we are describing or what normative theory 
we are employing. In other words, without some normative background, Wenar’s 
analysis is like an explanation of a wall clock without knowing the meaning of its 
numbers. I may understand the point that the wall clock shows the time, but to 
know what time it shoes, I must know what its numbers mean. To this extent, the 
Kind-Desire Theory calls for the normative background.  
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However, we can use Wenar’s analysis to describe how claim-rights and 
duties are assigned in some existing system of norms (e.g., the Scottish legal 
system) and make no normative judgment that would either approve or criticise 
such ascriptions. To this extent, the Kind-Desire Theory is truly independent of 
any justificatory account grounded in some moral, political or legal theory.  
 Considering that the Kind-Desire Theory is an impartial descriptive account 
of claim-rights, which, nevertheless, requires some normative theory in order to 
find out what claim-rights there are, there seems to be no reason to exclude virtue 
ethics from the justification of claim-rights. Therefore, Wenar’s analysis opens up 
an opportunity to start investigating possible connections between claim-rights 
and virtues. This inquiry should reveal whether or not those rights make the right-
holder more virtuous.9 
To sum up this chapter, I have argued that while most contemporary 
approaches to the nature of rights are based on Hohfeld’s conceptual analysis, 
most scholars disagree about the precise definition of rights. In most cases, this 
disagreement stems from different justificatory accounts those scholars defend. 
Hence, their views of the function(s) of rights play an essential role in their 
explications of what rights are. There are, as has been illustrated, two dominant 
descriptive as well as justificatory accounts of rights, the Will Theory and the 
Interest Theory. According to the Will Theory, rights provide the right-holder with 
choices or deliberation, and therefore most Will theorists take rights to be paired-
privileges and powers. The proponents of the Interest Theory, on the other hand, 
argue that rights protect and further the right-holder’s interests, and thus rights 
are essentially claims and immunities. Despite these differences, Will and Interest 
theorists share the assumption that rights can have only one function. Based on 
                                         
9 The Kind-Desire Theory has solved the above-mentioned issue which has troubled 
Interest theorists for years. As explained, Interest theorists often fail to describe 
role-based rights because the possession of such rights cannot be explained nor 
justified by individual interests. Recall the judge’s power-right to sentence 
criminals. None of the judge’s interests in possessing and exercising this right can 
possibly explicate and justify the ascription of that right to this individual judge. 
Wenar’s analysis does not face this issue because the power-right to sentence 
criminals is ascribed directly to the role of a judge and explained as a necessary 
instrument for the performance of role-based duties, that is, as a right enabling the 
judge to achieve and maintain justice in the society.  
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Wenar’s Several-Functions Theory, I have argued that we should reject this 
assumption and admit that rights have a plurality of functions. Finally, I have 
presented the Kind-Desire Theory of claim-rights which ascribes rights to social 
roles and natural kinds in accordance with role/kind-based duties. This analysis of 
rights, as I am about to demonstrate, enables me to connect the concept of rights 
with the idea of virtue acquisition via the realm of social roles.   
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CHAPTER II. VIRTUES 
Virtue ethics, emerging in ancient Greece, is one of the three main normative 
theories in the contemporary philosophical thought. The other two are deontology 
and consequentialism. As explained in the introduction, these theories differ in 
their attempts to answer somehow different questions. While deontology and 
consequentialism are concerned primarily with the rightness and wrongness of 
action, virtue ethics focuses on moral character and its excellences and defects, 
albeit it is true that most contemporary virtue ethicists also answer the question 
of rightness and wrongness of action (see, e.g., Hursthouse 1999, Slote 2001). 
 Though many nowadays advocates of virtue ethics are neo-Aristotelians 
(Foot 1978, McDowell 1979, MacIntyre 1981, Hursthouse 1999), some have also 
elaborated different interpretations of virtues (excellences). Michael Slote (2001, 
2013) has argued that virtues are grounded in empathy and sentiment, and 
therefore he draws inspiration mainly from British sentimentalists, such as Frances 
Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith. Christine Swanton (2003), on the other 
hand, has developed a theory of virtues based on Epicurean and Nietzschean 
viewpoints. Julia Driver (1996) and Thomas Hurka (2010), to give the last example, 
have argued that virtues can be soundly understood only if they are derived from 
consequentialism. Despite all these differences, Heather Battaly (2010, 2015) 
points out that there are certain similarities allowing us to unify these theories 
into ‘two key concepts of virtue’. 
 In this chapter, I introduce the two key concepts before proposing the 
working definition of virtues, which will be used throughout the dissertation. I do 
not argue for or against one of the two accounts of virtues. However, I give my 
reasons why we should employ an explanation of virtues that combines the 
essential features of the two key concepts. Virtues, on my account, are acquired 
traits, qualities and skills which make us better people in general as well as 
provide us with the practical knowledge of doing the right thing in given, virtue-
relevant circumstances. As will be explained, any theorist who takes virtues to be 
acquired traits, qualities and skills must answer the question about how such 
traits, qualities and skills are developed. Considering that this dissertation 
investigates how rights make the right-holder more virtuous, the question of virtue 
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acquisition is central to my argument. Accordingly, the final section of this 
chapter explicates how people develop virtues.  
 
3. Two ways to understand virtues 
There are two main explanations of what virtues are and who possesses them 
(Battaly 2010, 2015). According to one, virtues are acquired character traits and 
qualities in part constituted by virtuous motives and virtuous action (the rightness 
of action) depends upon virtue the action expresses. The other explanation takes 
virtues to be whatever quality (excellence) that enables someone to reliably 
attain good ends or consequences. The rightness of action, on this account, is 
derived from these good ends or consequences.   
Virtues as acquired character traits and virtuous motives. The first account 
works on the assumption that virtues are character traits and qualities that need 
to be acquired (learnt and habituated) and defines virtuous action as action 
expressing virtues through virtuous motives. Imagine that both X and Y donate 
money to charity every year. While X donates the money to help others, Y does so 
because it enables him to get tax write-offs. Although their actions and even the 
consequences of their actions seem to be the same, only X’s action, manifesting 
the virtue of beneficence through the virtuous motive, can be regarded as virtuous 
action, for Y’s action expresses selfishness coming from a wrong motive (Slote 
2001). 
 This interpretation of virtues is more traditional than the other one and can 
be found in almost all instances of ancient Greek and Roman moral philosophy 
except for Epicurean ethics (Irwin 1996). Its most prominent contemporary 
defenders include Phillipa Foot (1978), John McDowell (1979, 1985), Rosalind 
Hursthouse (1999), and Michael Slote (2001, 2013).  
Virtues as excellences for reliable achievements of good ends or 
consequences. According to the second account, virtues are whatever qualities 
(i.e., natural capacities, acquired skills and character traits) enabling us to 
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reliably attain good ends/consequences. Though motives can certainly help with 
securing this reliability, they do not play the central role here. This rather recent 
approach to virtues has been elaborated mainly by Julia Driver (1996) and Thomas 
Hurka (2010). According to them, virtues are of secondary importance, for the 
rightness of action (the fundamental question of normative ethics) is derived from 
achieving good ends/consequences. The principle of reliability, defining what 
virtues are and who possesses them, does not imply that we must always succeed 
in attaining such ends/consequences, or that our success is always perfect. Yet, 
if we wish but constantly fail to achieve some intended goal, we certainly lack 
goal-relevant virtues (Battaly 2015, Driver 1996).  
Consequently, the essential difference between the two accounts of virtues 
resides in emphasising different principles that determine what virtues are and 
who has such excellences. Recall the example of the two donators, X and Y, who 
keep donating their money to charities every year. It has been said that while X 
donates his money in order to help others, Y does so to get tax write-offs. Imagine 
now that X, who truly desires to help other people, has constantly failed to achieve 
that aim, because he keeps donating his money to charity frauds which have used 
the donated money to fund some illegal or egoistic activities. On the other hand, 
Y has always succeeded in helping others through donating his money. Most 
proponents of the first account would argue that irrespective of X’s constant 
failure, only X’s action is virtuous. Those who defend the second account would 
disagree and argue that regardless of Y’s actual motive, only Y possesses (goal-
relevant) virtues, since he reliably achieves the intended good end/consequence.   
 
4. The working definition of virtues  
Both interpretations of virtues, as Battaly remarks, are ‘legitimate, and … neither 
is any more or less right or real than the other’, for the concept of virtue is a 
‘thin’ concept that can be thicken in different ways (Battaly 2015: 25-27). 
However, there is one reason why we should use the first rather than second 
account of virtues while working up the virtue-based justification of rights. 
24 
 
 As illustrated, the second account of virtues puts emphasis on good 
ends/consequences. It follows that neither virtues nor motives are of primary 
importance in its explanation of the rightness of action. If we used this 
interpretation of virtues, rights would be seen as the right-holder’s excellences 
for reliable achievements of good ends/consequences. Since such 
ends/consequences can be defined in different ways, for instance, as maximising 
utility or achieving equality of capabilities, the virtue-based justification of rights 
I aim to develop would be similar or even identical to those that have been already 
presented by most utilitarians (Bentham 1789/1996) and many ‘capabilitists’ 
(Nusbaum 2006). Thus, any original and unexplored justification of rights based 
on virtue ethics must employ the first account of virtues which takes virtues and 
motives, not good ends/consequences, to be the normative ground for the 
rightness of action. 
 Furthermore, there is another, third way to understand virtues which 
combines the two above-mentioned accounts. In fact, most classical theories of 
virtues consider virtues as character traits and excellences partly constituted by 
virtuous motives, but also require the principle of reliability in order to detect 
who has such qualities (Battaly 2015). Linda Zagzebski (1996), a contemporary 
virtue ethicist, coalesces the two accounts of virtues in similar ways as many 
ancient philosophers did. Put differently, Zagzebski accepts the centrality of both 
motive and reliability in detecting whether some action is virtuous. Due to this 
incorporation of the principle of reliability, her explanation of what virtues are 
and who possesses them captures most of what the second interpretation demands 
in an account of virtues. Consequently, in our example of the two donators, X and 
Y, none of them has the virtue of beneficence. To possess this virtue, X (having 
the right motive) would need to reliably attain helping others via donating the 
money to charities, whereas Y (reliably achieving the good end) would need to act 
on the right motive. 
 The third explanation of virtues seems convincing because most accounts 
of virtues share the conviction that virtues are excellences. Anyone who has some 
excellence must also know how to put that excellence into effect. It is hard to 
imagine that someone is a kind person but constantly fails to act kindly. This 
person can certainly have kind-based (referring to kindness) motives whenever 
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interacting with other people, yet the constant failure exposes his or her inability 
to act kindly. Since kindness is, presumably, unintelligible when detached from 
its expression in action while interacting with others, the person’s inability to act 
kindly also reveals his or her lack of kindness. Moreover, many virtue ethicists 
since Aristotle have argued that virtues are excellences because they provide us 
with the practical knowledge of how to do the right thing in the right place at 
the right time. This ‘know-how’ implies the principle of reliability for to act kindly 
means to be kind in the right place at the right time. Put differently, some 
situations do not call for kindness and it would be in fact wrong (defective) to act 
kindly in these circumstances. Accordingly, the person who desires to be kind yet 
constantly fails to act kindly does not know how to put kindness into effect, and 
therefore it is unconvincing to claim that that person possesses the excellence of 
kindness. 
 Therefore, I believe that Zagzebski is correct in combining the two accounts 
of virtues. For the purpose of elaborating the virtue-based justification of rights, 
I propose the following working definition of virtues, which is based on the works 
of Zagzebski (1996) and Battaly (2015), and which will be used throughout the 
dissertation: 
The working definition: Virtues are acquired traits, qualities and skills 
that make people better people in general. They also provide people 
with the practical knowledge of what is the right (even best) thing to 
do in certain, virtue-relevant circumstances. To know how to do the 
right thing in the right place at the right time implies the reliability of 
attaining intended goals. Therefore, virtuous action is action which 
both manifests goal-relevant virtues and reliably leads to intended 
goals.  
 
5. The development of virtues 
Any virtue ethicist who claims that virtues are acquired traits, qualities and skills 
must answer the question of how such excellences are developed. Given the 
working definition of virtues offered in the last section and the aim of this 
dissertation, the question of virtue acquisition is central to my thesis. 
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 Recently, two phenomenal books on the development of virtues have been 
published, one edited and second co-edited by Nancy E. Snow (Snow 2015, Annas, 
Narvaez, Snow 2016). The books ‘challenge disciplinary isolation’ of virtue by 
connecting scholars from other fields to gain an interdisciplinary insight into virtue 
acquisition (Annas, Narvaez, Snow 2016: 1). There are, in short, many different 
explanations of how people can acquire virtues (see, e.g., Annas 2011, Narvaez 
2015, 2016, Thompson 2015). In this section, I focus solely on Snow’s own account 
for two reasons. First, her explication is based on a large amount of empirical 
research (Snow 2010, 2016). Second, Snow’s account permits developing virtues 
indirectly through perfecting social roles, and therefore it allows me to continue 
with researching into the links between rights that are ascribed to social roles and 
the idea of virtue acquisition. 
 According to Snow (2016), there are three ways to develop virtues, called 
(1) Habits of the Folk, (2) Intelligent Virtue: skill and expertise, and (3) the Way 
of the Junzi. The only important thing for us here is that these ways differ from 
each other in one’s motivation to acquire virtues. While both (2) and (3) 
presuppose the direct motivation to cultivate excellences, (1) explains how people 
develop virtues indirectly. Since it is (1), also named ‘the Minimal Virtue of the 
Folk’, which is incentive to the virtue-based justification of rights elaborated in 
the subsequent chapters, I am concerned only with this account of virtue 
acquisition. 
 To clarify the difference between direct and indirect motivations, think of 
Michael who aims to become a police officer, and Paul who strives for being a 
good father. To become a police officer, Michael must acquire certain skills and 
knowledge before he can (i.e., is authorised to) occupy the role of a police officer. 
Considering his desire to become a police officer, Michael is directly motivated to 
acquire such skills and knowledge. On the other hand, Paul is a father and will 
(most likely) occupy the role of a father irrespective of whether he acquires some 
other qualities or not. However, since Paul desires to become a good parent, he 
starts reading the literature on parenting, following its practical advice, as well 
as emulating people whom he regards as exemplars of a good parent. In so doing, 
Paul might well, sooner or later, develop qualities which come with good 
parenting, such as kindness, compassion, honesty, respectfulness, and patience. 
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Anyone who has read some books on parenting knows that almost all of them give 
the same practical advice, stating that you must be (i.e., constantly manifest) 
those traits you hope to develop in your children. The point is, as Snow (2016) 
argues, that there is a high probability that Paul will develop some or perhaps all 
such qualities even though he does not directly aim to acquire them. For it is his 
motivation to perfect his role of a father and subsequent attempts to become a 
good father that lead to the development of these virtues.10 
 The Minimal Virtue of the Folks explicates the indirect development of 
virtues on the cognitive basis. This acquisition happens ‘outside of conscious 
awareness through habits aimed at attaining virtue-relevant goals, imitating 
virtuous role models, or following practical advice’ (Snow 2016: 136). Snow (2016) 
maintains that both emulating role models and following practical advice can be 
explained in terms of goals. After all, Paul aims to become a good parent, and 
therefore he follows the practical advice and imitates role models. People, as 
Snow (2010, 2016) illustrates, can acquire virtues by achieving ‘virtue-relevant 
goals’, that is, goals associated often (though not necessarily) with role-based 
activities and tasks which require certain qualities and skills (virtues) for their 
successful performances. This is supported by the so-called ‘dual process theory’, 
which explains why some virtue-relevant goals can be more easily accessible to 
our consciousness than other goals.  
According to the dual process theory, there are two kinds of cognitive 
processing, conscious and automatic: 
‘Conscious processing is the familiar sort in which conscious or 
deliberate attention is brought to bear on a problem or activity. … 
Automatic or unconscious processes … operate outside conscious 
awareness … [and] include frequently performed and routinized 
actions.’ (Snow 2016: 139-140)  
Whenever someone holds some goal over a long time, the goal becomes ‘goal-
dependent automaticity’, stored in his or her automatic processing. Being a parent 
                                         
10 Snow (2016) also remarks that except for people who aim to occupy specific roles 
(e.g., soldiers, police officers, judges, etc.), most people living in the Western 
secular culture are not interested in the direct development of virtues. Yet, many 
people, she adds, do acquire virtues indirectly. 
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means primarily to care for children. Good parents, presumably, have a ‘caring 
for’ as their goal, and they hold the goal over a long time. Thus, the caring-for 
goal becomes goal-dependent automaticity. The goal is more readily accessible to 
their consciousness than other goals for it is easily triggered by similar, goal-
relevant situations, that is, whenever such parents encounter situations that call 
for caring. Snow (2016) argues that this immediate access is provided by ‘the 
representation of a value-relevant goal’, which is located at the forefront of 
consciousness, but the actual activation of that representation occurs outside of 
conscious awareness:  
‘…researchers have documented that representations of a variety of 
value-relevant goals (for example, the disposition to cooperate) are 
nonconsciously activatable across a number of situation-types. This 
suggests that representations of virtue-relevant goals, too, can be 
activated by situational features across types of situations, resulting in 
virtue-expressive actions that cross situation-types. The repeated 
performance of such actions results in habits of virtuous behaviour, 
which build up virtuous dispositions over time.’ (Snow 2016: 140)  
Furthermore, representations of value-relevant goals, as Snow (2016) 
continues, can become stable parts of someone’s personality because of 
‘schemas’, the concept elaborated by developmental psychologists Lapsley and 
Hill (2008). Schemas are ‘general knowledge structures that organise information, 
expectations and experience’, which develop in accordance with our individual 
experiences (Lapsley and Hill 2008: 322). Put differently, one’s constant 
processing of certain inputs sets relevant individual schemas. Snow suggests that 
representations of value-relevant goals (including representations of role models 
and how to enact practical advice) are ‘contextualised’ by such individual 
schemas. Accordingly, schemas become ‘essential parts of … “personality 
scaffolding” of virtue—the personality and knowledge structures that support 
virtuous action, habituation, and dispositions’ (Snow 2016: 141-142). 
Therefore, even people who are not directly motivated to cultivate virtues 
may develop virtues through aspiring to achieve virtue-relevant goals. Since one’s 
motivation to perfect his or her social role(s) is a virtue-relevant goal, it implies 
that anyone who strives for perfecting some social role(s) will eventually acquire 
(some or even all) role-relevant virtues. This indirect motivation results in the 
development of such excellences for the individual conducts repeatedly actions 
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which express goal-relevant virtues necessary for successful performances of his 
or her role-based activities and tasks.  
In Chapter I., I have introduced the Kind-Desire Theory which ascribes rights 
to social roles and natural kinds in accordance with role/kind-based desires. Many 
rights exist so that their holders can fulfil role/kind-based duties, activities and 
ends. Recall the right to sentence criminals that enables judges to achieve and 
maintain justice in the society. There is no reason to think that role/kind-based 
desires to perform such role/kind-based duties (activities, etc.) cannot be value-
relevant goals held over a long time. Most individual judges, I believe, aim to 
achieve and maintain justice in the society, and they seem to hold this goal at 
least so long as they occupy the role of a judge. It follows that if some role/kind-
based desire is held over a long time, it becomes the representation of value-
relevant goal operating in our automatic cognitive processing. Therefore, Snow’s 
explanation of this indirect virtue development is compatible with Wenar’s 
analysis of claim-rights. This compatibility opens up an opportunity for connecting 
the concept of a right with the idea of virtue acquisition, which is my next task. 
To sum up, I have presented two key concepts of virtues and argued that we 
should use the account of virtues which combines the central principles of the 
both concepts (motives and reliability) when elaborating the virtue-based 
justification of rights. Accordingly, virtues are acquired traits, qualities and skills 
that make us better people in general and provide us with the practical knowledge 
of how to do the right (even best) thing in virtue-relevant situations. This implies 
that virtuous action is action which expresses goal-relevant virtues and reliably 
leads to intended good (virtuous) goals. Considering that virtues are acquired 
traits, qualities and skills, I have also introduced Snow’s Minimal Virtue of the Folk 
in order to clarify how people develop virtues. People, as has been illustrated, 
acquire goal-relevant virtues via aspiring to achieve virtue-relevant goals, such as 
perfecting their social roles, and this acquisition occurs irrespective of their 
motives to cultivate such excellences. 
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CHAPTER III. RIGHTS AND VIRTUES: FIRST ENCOUNTER 
The Minimal Virtue of the Folk demonstrates that people develop goal-relevant 
virtues through perfecting social roles. The heuristic model of virtues worked out 
in this chapter explains how some role-based rights make the perfection of social 
roles possible. More precisely, I am going to argue that the so-called ‘enabling 
rights’ make right-holders more virtuous because they allow them to strive for 
approximating role models. 
 Enabling rights are rights which enable the right-holder to carry out his or 
her duties and activities. Such rights differ from those that exist principally to 
protect the right-holder’s desires (including interests and well-being), which will 
be called ‘protective rights’ throughout the dissertation.11 This distinction is in 
accordance with Wenar’s two types of desire-attributions explained in Chapter I. 
Consequently, the main difference between enabling rights and protecting rights 
is that the former are ascribed to perform duties, activities and ends, whereas the 
latter are assigned to protect desires that some duties, activities and ends are 
fulfilled by other people. To give some examples, consider the roles of a parent 
and a promisee. Most rights someone holds as a parent are role-based enabling 
rights, for they exist so that parents can carry out their parental duties, activities 
and ends. Promissory rights, on the other hand, protect the role-based desire that 
promisors fulfil their promissory duty to keep promises. This desire comes with 
the role of a promisee as its norm, meaning that it is not determined by some 
role-based duties, activities and ends the promisee, qua promisee, must perform. 
This chapter is concerned only with role-based enabling rights and their 
function of virtue acquisition. In short, I argue that on condition that someone 
strives to perfect some social role, role-based enabling rights (derived from that 
                                         
11 Note that the distinction between enabling and protective rights applies to 
natural kinds too, though most human and animal rights appear to be protective 
rather than enabling rights. Moreover, considering that many people also strive to 
perfect their humanity (the natural kind of a human being), the Minimal Virtue of 
the Folk need not be restricted to social roles. Accordingly, if there is some human 
(kind-based) rights which are enabling rights, such rights can develop virtues in the 
same way as role-based enabling rights, and this development is explained by the 
heuristic model of virtues. 
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role) allow this person (the right-holder) to develop role-relevant virtues as well 
as express them in action whilst performing role-based duties, activities and ends. 
To demonstrate this, I need to substantiate that the idea of virtue acquisition is 
compatible with the realm of social roles, and that the way someone exercises 
such rights is the way that leads to the development of virtues. I illustrate that 
social roles and the idea of virtue acquisition go hand in hand due to the 
interpretative nature of social roles, that is, the fact that the same role can be 
understood differently by different individuals. Furthermore, I argue that any 
development of some role-relevant virtue is possible only because of this 
interpretative nature and one’s possession of role-based enabling rights allowing 
this right-holder to approximate the ideal role model. 
 I start with clarifying what social roles are and why they are central to our 
morality, for finding out their characteristic features is important for connecting 
the realm of social roles with the idea of virtue development. Then, I present 
virtue contextualism, developed by Sarah Wright (2010), according to which 
virtues can be understood and expressed only in relation to roles individuals 
occupy. In the following section, I explicate how the heuristic model of virtues 
works and deal with certain issues arising from the interpretative nature of social 
roles. Finally, I introduce two main objections to the heuristic model of virtues 
and argue that none of them undermines the idea that role-based enabling rights 
make the right-holder more virtuous.        
 
6. Social roles and virtue contextualism 
Social roles have been studied primarily by sociologists and social psychologists 
(Mead 1934, Parsons 1951, Goffman 1956, and Berger and Luckmann 1991), who 
are particularly interested in the social structure, social institutions, 
institutionalised human conduct, and the distribution and acquisition of social 
knowledge. ‘All institutionalized conduct’, as Berger and Luckmann point out, 
‘involves roles. … The roles represent the institutional order and only through this 
representation in performed role can the institution manifest itself in actual 
experience’ (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 92).  
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Philosophers, on the other hand, overlooked the importance of social roles 
in our everyday lives for a long time. The first philosopher who started inquiring 
seriously into social institutions, roles and their effects on our life was Hegel 
(Hardimon 1994). British idealists, namely T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley, drew 
main inspiration from him and it was Bradley’s (1927) ‘My station and its duties’, 
a chapter in his Ethical Studies, that offered the first elaborate explanation of 
role obligations in British moral philosophy. Albeit it is true that some modern 
political philosophers (e.g., Rawls 1971 and Dworkin 1986), also deal with the 
concept of social roles, ‘[c]ontemporary moral philosophers have, by and large, 
neglected [social] obligations, regarding them as marginal at best’; yet, as Michael 
O. Hardimon (1994) argues, ‘they are central to morality and should be taken 
seriously’ (Hardimon 1994: 333).  
Many agree (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1966, Hardimon 1994, Radden and 
Sadler 2009) that social roles are central to morality for two reasons. First, they 
provide role-bearers with role-based practical reasons to act in certain ways. For 
roles ‘refer to constellation of institutionally specified rights and duties organized 
around an institutionally specified social function’ (Hardimon 1994: 334). Such 
constellations include also role-relevant values and even emotions. While judges, 
for instance, must know when to restrain their feelings of compassion, doctors 
should know how to display this feeling appropriately. The second reason consists 
in the fact that roles confer and partly constitute an individual’s identity. The 
role identification, Hardimon explains, resides in (i) occupying the role, (ii) 
recognising that one occupies the role, and (iii) conceiving of oneself as someone 
for whom the norms of the role function as reasons.  
I add that there are two other reasons why social roles are central to 
morality. They provide people with expectations of what role-bearers should do, 
and these expectations call for the appraisal of expected role-relevant behaviour. 
Both my expectations of other people’s role-relevant conduct and my awareness 
of the fact that others also expect me to act in role-relevant ways belong to the 
most essential building blocks of the social reality. In other words, social roles are 
essential to human action and interaction in the society   
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Many virtue ethicists (e.g., MacIntyre 1981, Battaly 2015) are sceptical 
about finding the fundamental connections between social roles and virtues. 
Virtues, they claim, are traits, qualities and skills of persons not of role-bearers. 
Yet, Sarah Wright (2010) argues that there are in fact such fundamental 
connections between roles and virtues, because virtues can be understood and 
manifested only within the realm of roles (including humankind). Wright’s ‘virtue 
contextualism’ works on the assumption that we are embedded in our lives with 
already existing duties, activities and ends, and therefore with created and 
defined expectations. This embodiment starts with our birth due to 
noncontractual roles, that is, roles we are born into, such as familial roles and 
citizenship. It follows, as Wright asserts, that someone is always virtuous in the 
role of ____ (including humankind). Moreover, the idea of mean, a desirable 
middle between two extremes, is unintelligible in a ‘vacuum’ created by 
separating virtues from the reality of roles. In other words, to pinpoint the mean, 
which is central to Aristotelian understanding of virtues, we must know which role 
the individual occupies. For any expression of the two extremes of some virtue, 
say, cowardice (a defect of the virtue of courage) and foolhardiness (an extreme 
of the virtue of courage), always relates to social roles and their practical reasons 
for action (Wright 2010). 
Consider Wright’s example of a police officer and a bystander who both 
witness a burglary. Though they both face the same situation, their virtuous 
actions differ. While chasing the criminal expresses courage in the action of the 
police officer, the same action expresses foolhardiness in the case of the 
bystander. There are two reasons explaining this conclusion. First, the bystander, 
qua bystander, lacks a proper training of how to catch and restrain criminals. 
Second, even if the bystander has been in some similar training for catching and 
restraining criminals, he or she lacks the police officer’s role-based enabling right 
to stop and seize other people. This is the first direct link between a role-based 
enabling right and the right-holder’s expression of virtue in action while 
performing role-based duties, activities and ends.  
Wright’s virtue contextualism is also supported by the normative features 
of social roles. Because of the role identification, the police officer, qua police 
officer, has different practical reasons to chase the criminal than the bystander. 
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Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, there are also different expectations of 
role-relevant behaviour calling for different evaluations of the actual actions of 
the police officer and the bystander. Those normative features of social roles 
seem to capture why the same action, chasing the criminal, can express both 
courage (in the case of the police officer) and foolhardiness (in the case of the 
bystander). Thus, virtues are always understood and expressed in relation to roles 
occupied by individuals, even though they are traits, qualities and skills of those 
individual persons. How do we know which action in the realm of one particular 
social role expresses virtues and which action does not? We know it because we 
know the heuristic model of virtues which defines the perfect standard of role-
relevant behaviour. 
 
7. The heuristic model of virtues 
To know the perfect standard of role-relevant behaviour, we need to know an 
ideal role model. The heuristic model of virtues is such an ideal role model, 
defining what role-relevant virtues are and how they are to be expressed in action. 
The heuristic model also explains how role-based enabling rights develop role-
relevant virtues while perfecting social roles. In principle, any actual role-bearer 
can always imagine what an ideal role model would do in given, role-relevant 
circumstances. Consequently, any actual role-bearer can always strive to 
approximate such an ideal (virtuous) role model. If we had no role-based enabling 
rights, we would be unable to approximate such ideal role models, and therefore 
we could neither acquire role-relevant virtues nor express them in action while 
performing role-based duties, activities and ends. 
To assert that any actual role-bearer can always imagine the heuristic 
model implies that the heuristic model is available to anyone who occupies some 
social role. In order to explain this availability, we need to recall some normative 
features of social roles, namely the fact that roles create expectations of what 
role-bearers should do as well as call for the appraisal of actual role-relevant 
conduct. When we expect some role-relevant behaviour, we usually expect the 
minimal standard of the performance of role-based duties, activities and ends. As 
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will be argued, any evaluation of some actual performance presupposes the 
knowledge of both the expected minimal and perfect standards of that 
performance, and hence anyone who participates in evaluating other people’s 
role-relevant behaviour claims to know the heuristic model of role-relevant 
virtues. 
The expected minimal standard is derived, to a large degree, from our 
common understanding of what social roles are. This understanding is shared by 
members of the society and comprises of their awareness of social institutions, 
their functions as well as of the basic package of role-based rights, duties, norms, 
values, etc., defining each social role. Without this common understanding, which 
I shall call ‘the common knowledge of social roles’, we would not know that 
bartenders serve customers at the bar, judges aim to achieve and maintain 
justice, car mechanics check and repair cars, etc. This common knowledge 
suggests that we have similar expectations of conduct associated with the same 
social role. 
However, the expected minimal standard is context-dependent and often 
derived from people’s different experiences with actual performances of role-
based duties, activities and ends. If we pay for the top-class services, we 
reasonably expect the top-class performances of individuals whose work is to 
deliver the services. Although our expectations in this case are derived from our 
understanding of the ideal role model representing the perfect standard, such 
expectations still constitute the expected minimal standard. Consider also people 
who have always travelled first class. Such people may well find the expected 
minimal standard of second class travelling being below their expected minimal 
standard. Consequently, different people seem to have somehow different 
expectations of the minimal standard when it comes to the same (similar) social 
role due to their different experiences. (I will argue later that the common 
knowledge of social roles secures that the minimal standard is essentially the same 
for everyone.) 
Expecting certain role-relevant behaviour often calls for the assessment of 
actual actions conducted by individual role-bearers. To tell whether some 
performance is ‘good’, we need to know both the minimal and perfect standards 
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of role-relevant behaviour. In fact, any evaluation of an actual performance of 
role-based duties, activities and ends is based on the gradual evaluative system 
consisting of at least four general marks. For any performance can be regarded as 
poor when it is below the expected minimal standard, as appropriate if it reaches 
the minimal standard, as well when this performance is close to the perfect 
standard, and excellent or perfect when it achieves the ideal (virtuous) standard. 
It follows that whenever we take part in evaluating some actual role-relevant 
behaviour, we determine its minimal and perfect standards, and then we pinpoint 
the actual performance in accordance with the two standards in order to apprise 
it by one of the four general marks. In other words, whenever we participate in 
this evaluation, we claim to know the expected minimal standard as well as the 
perfect standard of role-relevant behaviour.  
To know this perfect standard is to know what an ideal role model would 
do. A good parent is any parent who comes close to the ideal parent, representing 
the perfect standard of performances of parental duties, activities and ends, 
whereas poor parents diverge too far from this ideal, for they do not reach the 
expected minimal standard. Since we do evaluate people’s actual role-relevant 
conduct daily, we all claim to know the heuristic model of role-relevant virtues, 
and therefore the heuristic model seems to be available to everyone. Perhaps 
more importantly, it is available to role-bearers for they also appraise their actual 
fulfilments of role-based duties, activities and ends. The point is that we would 
not be able to strive for perfecting social roles without the knowledge of ideal 
role models we must approximate in order to perfect these roles. Accordingly, the 
evaluative viewpoint of role-bearers is of primary importance in this chapter. 
Therefore, the perfection of a social role consists in approximating the 
perfect standard of role-relevant conduct. Social roles, as explained, are 
constellation of institutionally specified rights and duties, ascribed to them by 
social institutions the roles represent. Given that enabling rights are ascribed to 
social roles so that individual role-bearers can perform role-based duties, 
activities and ends, it seems that such rights also allow role-bearers to strive for 
approximating ideal role models. In the next section, this thought will be worked 
out in detail.          
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8. The interpretative nature of social roles 
It has been argued that the heuristic model of virtues is available to everyone, but 
does it mean that everyone has the same understanding of this model when it 
comes to the same social role? If different people can have different expectations 
of the minimal standard of the same role-relevant behaviour, why should they 
have the same views of its perfect standard? 
There is no doubt that role-bearers have a more detailed understanding of 
their role-based rights, duties, etc., than people who do not occupy such roles. 
Think of Paul, who is a father, and David, who is not interested in children at all. 
Both Paul and David know what the role of a parent is because they share the 
common knowledge of social roles. Yet, it is very unlikely that they share the same 
views of an ideal parent representing the perfect standard of role-relevant 
behaviour simply because of Paul’s personal experience with parenting. Suppose 
also that Paul aims to be a good father and therefore actively searches for 
practical advice by reading books on parenting and emulates people whom he 
regards as exemplars of a good parent. These activities help Paul define as well 
as constantly redefine his understanding of the ideal parent. Had David been 
interested in parenting, their views of the heuristic model could have been less 
different.  
However, even two individuals occupying the same role can have somehow 
different definitions of the ideal role model, because the same role can be 
understood differently by different individuals. For some, ideal parents earn 
enough money to satisfy all the needs and desires their families might have, 
whereas for others ideal parenting consists in spending as much quality time with 
their families as possible. As Hardimon (1994) explains, all these differences stem 
from the so-called ‘interpretative nature’ of social roles. I have asserted that we 
can tell which actions are virtuous in the realm of some social role due to our 
knowledge of the heuristic model of role-relevant virtues. Does the interpretative 
nature of social roles imply that one’s understanding of role-relevant virtues 
depends on one’s interpretation of social roles?  
38 
 
This section demonstrates that the common knowledge of social roles 
secures that people’s views of the minimal and perfect standards of the same role-
relevant conduct are essentially the same. I also argue that the interpretative 
nature of social roles is vital to the idea of virtue acquisition via perfecting social 
roles, for it creates the scope for this perfection.  
First and foremost, although we can understand the same role differently, 
we cannot ‘custom tailor’ role-based rights and duties, because they are firmly 
organised around an institutionally specified social function (Hardimon 1994). 
Role-based rights and duties, as explained above, form a significant part of the 
common knowledge of social roles. If we did not have this knowledge, we would 
not know what particular roles are and we could neither expect role-relevant 
behaviour nor evaluate role-bearers’ actual performances. This common 
knowledge also seems to delimit our possible interpretations of social roles. No 
interpretation can be radically different from the common knowledge since it 
would produce actions that could not be recognised as role-relevant behaviour. 
Imagine a father letting his eighteenth-month old child drinks alcohol because he 
believes that one of the most important parental duties is to provide all children 
with total liberty. Not only is this interpretation controversial and, arguably, 
wrong, it is too alien to our common knowledge of the role of a parent. There is 
a high probability that observers who do not know the relationship between the 
father and the child will not recognise him as the child’s father because of his 
radically divergent interpretation of the role of a parent. 
The same applies to our expectations of the minimal standard and views of 
the perfect standard of role-relevant behaviour, for such standards are also 
derived, to a large degree, from and limited by the common knowledge of social 
roles. Accordingly, any radical interpretation would make our expectations and 
evaluation socially unrealistic. The expected minimal standard would fail to 
capture the commonly-defined appropriateness of human action associated with 
the role, and the perfect standard would be manifested in performances that do 
not represent the commonly-defined essence of the role. It follows that such 
radical interpretations fail to pinpoint the ideal role model, and hence they cannot 
define what role-relevant virtuous are and how such qualities should be expressed 
in action. In other words, the common knowledge of social roles secures that 
39 
 
everyone has essentially the same understanding of the minimal and perfect 
standards of the same role-relevant conduct.  
Furthermore, the interpretative nature of social roles is vital to the idea of 
virtue development through perfecting social roles for two reasons. First, it 
creates the scope for individual approaches towards social roles and their role-
based rights and duties. Second, this scope permits the development of role-
relevant virtues because it allows role-bearers to exercise their role-based rights 
in different ways whilst performing role-based duties, activities and ends. These 
differences in exercising the same role-based right, in turn, expose whether or 
not such individuals are motivated to perfect the social role they occupy.  
Consider two police officers, David and Michael. Michael witnesses two men 
who are assaulting a woman in the street. Since he keeps in training in order to 
be capable of dealing with similar situations, Michael knows what to do and, 
consequently, takes actions against two men. Given that the main duties of a 
police officer are maintaining and enforcing social order, Michael knows how to 
perform his role-based duties. This exposes Michael’s approach towards the role 
he occupies, for he appears to endeavour to perform his role-based duties well or 
even excellently. David, on the other hand, is not interested in developing marital 
arts skills, nor does he care about preparing himself for such situations in any 
other way. Suppose that this lack of interest comes from David’s interpretation 
(whatever it might be) of the role of a police officer. When he happens to face 
the situation of the two men assaulting a woman, he lacks both the practical 
knowledge of what to do and the skills that create this knowledge. Put differently, 
David, unlike Michael, does not know how to fulfil his role-based duties. The only 
option David seems to have is to call his (more competent) colleagues, which is 
the same thing the virtuous bystander would do. Consequently, David’s role-
relevant behaviour is seen as the failure to achieve the expected minimal 
standard, and thereby as the manifestation of incompetence and, presumably, a 
role-relevant vice: cowardice. 
The role of a police officer contains both enabling rights allowing any 
individual who occupies the role to reach at least the expected minimal standard 
of performances, and duties which require the development of certain qualities 
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and skills (virtues) to be fulfilled successfully. The point is that David’s lack of 
interest in acquiring such virtues reveals his personal approach towards his role-
based enabling rights and duties, which also indicates that he is not motivated to 
perfect his role of a police officer. Moreover, his failure to reach the minimal 
standard while fulfilling role-based duties shows that he is rather a poor police 
officer who may sooner or later lose a job. Therefore, role-based enabling rights 
and duties can be exercised and performed in different ways that mirror individual 
approaches towards the role itself. Such different approaches, stemming from the 
interpretative nature of social roles, allow us to tell a lot about individuals who 
occupy that role. 
The example of the two police officers also demonstrates that role-based 
enabling rights and role-based duties function as socially constructed instruments 
for the development of virtues and the expression of virtues in action.12 There is 
no doubt that Michael strives for perfecting his role of a police officer and hence 
we can conclude that he endeavours to approximate the ideal police officer. 
However, had he had no such role-based enabling rights allowing him to perform 
his role-based duties, he would have been unable to approximate the heuristic 
model. Recall the example of the police officer and the bystander who both 
witness a burglary. In this case, the police officer can express courage in action 
because he has the practical knowledge of how to restrain criminals as well as the 
role-based enabling right which empowers him to put this knowledge into effect. 
As suggest in that example, it is the possession of the police officer’s right that, 
first and foremost, permits the manifestation of courage whilst chasing the 
criminal. Since the bystander lacks this enabling right, he or she has different 
practical reasons for action in the situation which make chasing the criminal 
foolhardy.  
It follows that role-based enabling rights help to explain the difference 
between virtuous and vicious actions in social roles, and therefore they also define 
(at least partially) what role-relevant virtues are. This difference cannot be fully 
described unless we admit that social roles can be understood differently, that is, 
                                         
12 Role-based enabling rights and duties are socially constructed instruments 
because they are defined and ascribed by social institutions. 
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unless we accept the interpretative nature of social roles. It is this characteristic 
feature that creates the scope for individual approaches towards the same role 
and its role-based rights and duties. Police officers who only keep up with the 
minimal standard of role-relevant behaviour might, like David in our example, find 
themselves incompetent in many situations while exercising role-based enabling 
rights in order to carry out role-based duties, activities and ends. Consequently, 
they can often fail to express role-relevant virtues. 
Furthermore, the interpretative nature of social roles goes hand in hand 
with the Minimal Virtue of the Folk, according to which people can develop virtues 
through perfecting social roles. It is also compatible with the heuristic model of 
virtues clarifying why role-based enabling rights are necessary for the 
development of virtues via perfecting social roles. Imagine the world where social 
roles are not understood differently. If there was only one way to understand role-
based rights and duties, there would be only one way how to exercise such rights 
and carry out such duties. The gradual evaluative system we use when assessing 
actual role-relevant behaviour would make no sense, because there would be only 
two options when it comes to the occupation of social roles. Individuals either 
reach the expected standard of performances or they fail to reach it. It implies 
that there would be no scope for virtue acquisition within the realm of social roles, 
since there could be only one standard of role-relevant conduct. Though it is true 
that some social roles may be less prone to different personal approaches than 
others, the idea that there are only two options when occupying social roles 
conflicts with our reality of social roles. For I believe that the sphere of each 
social role permits and, in most cases, calls for innovativeness and an active 
personal development.  
Such an active personal development is often described as the personal 
growth in the domain of professions, and there is no doubt that the majority of 
social roles we occupy are professional roles. The idea of the personal growth is 
central to the concept of a promotion at work. When considering whether to give 
someone a promotion, we evaluate that individual’s ability to perform new and/or 
additional duties, activities, etc., at least at the appropriate (minimal) level, and 
then we cogitate whether the quality of his or her performances will eventually 
improve. In other words, we try to find out whether the person is ready for the 
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personal growth that comes with the new opportunities and tasks.13 This, I believe, 
gives us an evidence that the realm of social roles is completely compatible with 
the idea of virtue acquisition, because any personal growth whilst occupying some 
social role must reside in developing role-relevant virtues. 
To summarise this section, I have illustrated that the heuristic model of 
virtues is a complement to Snow’s Minimal Virtue of the Folk, because it explains, 
on the social-role basis, how people can develop role-relevant virtues through 
perfecting social roles. More precisely, the heuristic model represents the perfect 
standard of role-relevant behaviour which is, in its essence, available to anyone 
who participates in evaluating someone else’s actual role-relevant conduct. 
Nobody, I have argued, can strive for approximating the heuristic model without 
the possession of role-based enabling rights that allow this approximation. 
Therefore, such rights are necessary for the development of role-relevant virtues 
and have the function of virtue acquisition. However, role-based enabling rights 
have this function only because of the interpretative nature of social roles. The 
fact that different people understand the same role differently permits individual 
approaches towards the role and its rights and duties. Any individual striving to 
perfect some social role must attempt to exercise his or her role-based enabling 
rights in the way the ideal role model would do. It follows that if there were only 
one way how to exercise such rights in order to fulfil role-based duties, activities 
and ends, there would be no scope for development. Consequently, role-based 
enabling rights and role-based duties are socially constructed instruments for both 
the personal growth (virtue development) and the manifestation of role-relevant 
virtues in action.   
 
9. Objections 
There are, I believe, two main objections to the heuristic model of virtues. The 
first one questions connections between social roles and virtues, the second 
objection challenges the idea that someone can develop and possess only some 
                                         
13 I am grateful to Dr Hugh Lazenby for this idea. 
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role-relevant virtues. In this section, I argue that none of them undermines the 
heuristic model.   
 Some virtue ethicists (e.g., MacIntyre 1981, Battaly 2015) have been 
sceptical about finding the fundamental connections between social roles and 
virtues. They argue that virtues are traits and qualities that constitute character 
and make us better people in general, whereas social roles split character due to 
their different practical reasons and norms. Character, as Radden and Sadler 
explain, is ‘the unique and idiosyncratic construct that holds, and holds together, 
all the dispositions and traits making each individual the unique person, and moral 
agent’ (Radden and Sadler 2009: 153). Such virtue ethicists then point out that 
certain social roles require the development of qualities and skills which are 
normally (i.e., outside their role-relevant context) seen as defects or vices. 
Consequently, individuals who perfect these roles will eventually acquire defects 
affecting their moral characters. To use Battaly’s (2015) example, the role of a 
police interrogator can be perfected only if individuals cultivate dishonesty (i.e., 
become good at lying and manipulating). How, as these virtue ethicists wonder, 
can the perfection of social roles such as a police interrogator lead to the 
development of virtues?   
 The issue concerns also human conduct which is socially unacceptable and 
considered as social deviance. Good serial killers and thieves seem to manifest 
high intelligence, shrewdness, courage, and perhaps even justice. Think of Dexter 
(American television series), a serial killer who cannot resist his need for killing 
people but kills only criminals who are fugitives from justice, or the story of Robin 
Hood, the famous outlaw who is said to have robbed the rich to help the poor. Do 
good serial killers and thieves possess such virtues?  
 The answer to the two-sided problem is that (i) although some individuals 
can be affected by the development of role-relevant qualities and skills usually 
seen as defects, most of them will not be, and that (ii) severe social deviance can 
never result in virtue acquisition. Consider the second answer first. According to 
Wright, virtues can be acquired and manifested only in the sphere of social roles 
that are intrinsically valuable:   
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‘There are some social roles that are not valuable in themselves. 
Perfection of these social roles does not count as a virtue. One can 
develop the skills needed to become a good thief; yet this is not to 
develop a virtue. For virtues are part of an overall good life; they are 
excellences of a person. If a social role is compatible with living well, 
then we can develop virtues within that social role. But if a social role 
is incompatible with living a good life, developing an “excellence” 
within that social role will not count as a virtue. An excellent thief is 
not an excellent person.’ (Wright 2010: 108)   
Another, additional way to explain why ‘roles’ of serial killers, thieves, etc. 
are not intrinsically valuable is that these roles are not social roles at all. As 
explained, social roles represent social institutions and their specific social 
functions. Murderers, thieves, etc. do not represent any social institution, for they 
are social deviance. Deviance, according to sociologists, is any behaviour violating 
social norms and rules (Andersen, Taylor, Logio 2016: 148). Consequently, any 
instance of social deviance is, arguably, incompatible with an overall good life. 
Despite the fact that social deviance is always relative to the society and its 
culture, I assume that certain types of human conduct, such as murder, rape, 
theft, etc., have been always regarded as the severe (often punishable) 
manifestations of social deviance in most cultures all around the world. Therefore, 
I conclude that no perfection of severe social deviance can develop virtues. 
Social roles that require the cultivation of role-relevant qualities and skills 
seen as defects (vices) seem to pose a real threat to both virtue contextualism 
and the heuristic model of virtues. Given that virtues make us better people in 
general, it follows that vices must be defects that make us worse people in 
general. Accordingly, the development of such defects via perfecting social roles 
requiring these vices for the successful performance of role-based duties, 
activities and ends corrupts one’s moral character. 
One solution to this problem lies in the so-called ‘role set’, a sociological 
term describing the fact that many people occupy more than one social role at 
the same time. I believe that if we balance the numbers of good qualities/skills 
and of defects required for the perfection of someone’s role set, good qualities 
and skills will always outweigh defects. It is still true that any acquired defect 
might affect one’s character, and therefore some individuals who strive for 
perfecting the role of a police interrogator can eventually start lying and 
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manipulating with others when occupying other social roles. Moreover, it is also 
true that the role of a police interrogator might attract people who tend to lie 
and manipulate more than those who are usually honest. Such people will also 
easily achieve the perfect standard of role-based behaviour than honest people. 
However, I do not think that individuals who are police interrogators must 
necessarily become worse or even vicious people in general, for they occupy tens 
of other social roles which, overall, demand the development of many role-
relevant virtues.   
Another solution is that the role of a police interrogator represents a social 
institution, namely the criminal justice institution, and its function consisting in 
solving crimes and achieving justice. Based on the working definition of virtues 
offered in Chapter II., virtues provide us with the practical knowledge of how to 
do the right thing in the right place at the right time, which, in turn, enables us 
to reliably achieve intended aims. Accordingly, it can be argued that since virtues 
are always understood and expressed in relation to social roles, the development 
of lying and manipulating while perfecting the role of a police interrogator is not 
the cultivation of dishonesty but virtue acquisition. For being a good liar and 
manipulator is, arguably, the best thing to do in given, role-relevant 
circumstances. 
The second objection to the heuristic model of virtues questions the idea 
that someone can develop and thereby possess only some, role-relevant virtues. 
It works on the assumption that one virtue cannot exist without the others, called 
‘the unity of virtues’. In the Western philosophical tradition of virtue ethics, 
philosophers have spoken of cardinal virtues. For ancient Greek philosophers, 
there were four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, temperance, and courage. 
Most Christian philosophers added also faith, hope and charity. These virtues were 
thought to be united and essentially interconnected. Therefore, one virtue could 
not exist without the others and moral agents could not be virtuous unless they 
had all the virtues. 
This explanation of virtue implies the idea that there are two levels of human 
conduct, one, which is perfect and virtuous, and the other, which is imperfect 
and subject to a gradual system of moral evaluation. Perfect (virtuous action) does 
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not permit any degree of imperfection. As Adam Smith points out, acting 
virtuously is like ‘shooting at a mark, the man who missed it by an inch had equally 
missed it with him who had done so by a hundred yards’ (Smith 1759/1982: 291), 
and only those who hit the mark act virtuously. Considering that someone does 
not possess some virtue unless that person has all the virtues, it seems that only 
fully virtuous agents can in fact express virtues in action. Such an intransigent 
interpretation of virtuous agency also implies that only few extraordinary people 
can actually achieve this level of perfection. Consequently, the fully virtuous 
agency has always functioned primarily as the model of virtue which helps ordinary 
people to deal with their everyday struggles, efforts and moral dilemmas. Any 
imperfect action, on the other hand, is gradually evaluated on the basis of how 
far it is from the perfect action. The closer to perfection the action gets, the 
morally better it is, even though it remains imperfect (non-virtuous). The bottom 
line of this gradual system is the appropriateness of imperfect action, grounded 
in the accepted moral minimum, named ‘kathekon’ (Greek stoicism), ‘commune 
officium’ (Cicero), ‘convenentia’ (Seneca), or ‘propriety’ (Smith) (Waszek 1984). 
The idea of the two levels of human conduct resembles the discussion about 
the expected minimal and perfect standards of role-relevant behaviour. However, 
there is one fundamental difference residing in my rejection of the unity of virtues 
which has two important implications. First, on the view I defend, people do not 
need to develop all the virtues in order to possess and hence express only some, 
role-relevant virtues. Second, I believe that people can reach the role-relevant 
level of perfection without reaching all the perfect standards of other social roles 
they occupy. It follows that someone might be an excellent parent who has 
acquired role-relevant virtues, such as kindness, patience, etc., without being an 
excellent manager and a good driver. I do not deny that some extraordinary people 
can achieve the level of full virtuousness, I only claim that this is not the only way 
how people can acquire and express virtues. 
There are in fact two reasons for rejecting the unity of virtues. First, the 
idea of the unity of virtues implies the fully virtuous agency which cannot be a 
good model of virtues for everyone. Given that the fully virtuous agency is meant 
to be the model of virtues for ordinary people, it fails to accomplish its function.  
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A model of virtue, as Kimberley Brownlee explicates, can be anything that 
‘exemplifies certain observable traits, activities, or behaviours’ repeatedly or 
routinely (Brownlee 2015: 3). It is not the sameness of kinds that matters, but the 
sameness of action and/or function. Accordingly, although flying birds, to use 
Brownlee’s examples, can serve as a model for building an aircraft, they cannot 
model how to play chess. To be a ‘good’ model, these traits and activities need 
to satisfy a certain level of excellence, as there is no point to in learning how to 
play chess by studying someone who has never won a game. Nevertheless, the 
level of excellence, and this is important, must be relative to the repeater’s level. 
Albeit the chess grandmaster is not a good model for beginners, he or she is a good 
model for upper-intermediates (Brownlee 2015).  
The fully virtuous agency cannot be a good model of virtues for everyone 
because it is like the chess grandmaster in the above-mentioned example, whereas 
many ordinary people are, presumably, at beginner or intermediate levels of 
virtue development. Consequently, many people are unable to approximate the 
fully-virtuous model, and hence this model is not, unlike the heuristic model, 
available to everyone. To keep the idea of virtue acquisition via emulating models 
of virtues, which has been central to many theories of virtues, the meaning of 
virtuous agency cannot be restricted to the possession of all the cardinal virtues.  
The second reason for rejecting the idea of the unity of virtues is that this 
explanation of virtue appears to conflict with our understanding of personality or 
character. As mentioned above, character is the unique construct holding together 
all the dispositions and traits that make us individual persons. One’s individuality 
consists, arguably, in the fact that one has developed certain character 
excellences as well as some character defects. Imagine that Paul is perfectly kind, 
emphatic and moderate, yet lacks courage, whereas Andrew is courageous and 
prudent, but is not kind at all. Both Paul and Andrew have unique personalities 
originating from their unique proportions of excellences to defects. Although it is 
convincing to think that the development of one virtue leads to the development 
of other virtues that are in close proximity to the first acquired virtue, this 
plausibility need not imply the unity of virtues. In fact, we do not hesitate to aver 
that both Paul, who is perfectly kind, emphatic and moderate, yet lacks courage, 
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and Andrew, who is courageous and prudent, but not kind, possess such 
excellences as well as defects.  
Therefore, I propose that we should reject the idea of the unity of virtues as 
the only possible definition of virtuous agency. This does not mean that the fully 
virtuous agency cannot serve as a good model of virtues for some people, and the 
two models (the fully virtuous agency and the heuristic model) can presumably 
coexist with each other. Yet, if we wish to keep the idea of virtue acquisition by 
emulating models of virtues, we must keep the heuristic model of virtues because 
it is a good model of virtue for everyone.  
 This chapter, to conclude, has established the first connections between 
rights and virtues. I have argued that role-based enabling rights make right-holders 
more virtuous on condition that they strive for perfecting their social roles. To be 
more specific, I have demonstrated that these rights have the function of virtue 
acquisition because they allow their holders to approximate the perfect standard 
of role-relevant conduct. Since such rights are necessary for the development of 
role-relevant virtues through perfecting social roles, the heuristic model of virtues 
complements Snow’s Minimal Virtue of the Folks, because it gives us a role-based 
explication of how people develop virtues through perfecting their social roles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PART TWO 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
In Part One, I have illustrated that rights have a plurality of functions and proposed 
that one of these functions is to make the right-holder more virtuous. Then, I have 
argued that at least role-based enabling rights have this function of virtue 
acquisition.  
My argumentation has been based on Wenar’s Kind-Desire Theory and 
Snow’s Minimal Virtue of the folk, for those two accounts allow me to connect the 
concept of a right with the idea of virtue development in the realm of social roles. 
According to the Kind-Desire Theory (Chapter I.), rights are ascribed to social roles 
and natural kinds rather than individual beings on the basis of the precise 
identification of role/kind-based desires. The Minimal Virtue of the Folk (Chapter 
II.) clarifies, on the cognitive basis, how people can develop virtues through 
perfecting social roles. Finally, the heuristic model of virtues (Chapter III.) 
provides another, role-based explanation of this type of virtue acquisition. That 
is, the heuristic model pinpoints the scope for the development of virtues within 
the realm of social roles and highlights the necessity of role-based enabling rights 
for acquiring virtues via perfecting social roles. In principle, any development of 
some role-relevant virtue through perfecting some social role consists in 
approximating the ideal role model (the heuristic model). To strive for 
approximating this model, one must attempt to exercise role-based enabling rights 
to perform one’s role-based duties in the way the ideal role model would do. Since 
role-based enabling rights permit the emulation of such models, these rights are 
necessary for virtue acquisition through perfecting social roles.  
However, not all role-based rights are enabling rights and not all enabling 
rights must be role-based rights. Some role-based rights are protective rights and 
some enabling rights might be kind-based rights. Enabling rights, to recall the 
distinction, enable the right-holder to carry out duties, activities and ends (e.g., 
the police officer’s rights to stop and search people, the judge’s right to sentence 
criminals, etc.). These rights are ascribed to social roles and natural kinds in 
accordance with role/kind-based duties on the basis of the duty derived 
attributions of desires. Protective rights, on the other hand, protect the right-
holder’s desires that duties, activities and ends are fulfilled by other people. Such 
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desires are recognised as norms by existing system of norms, and therefore 
protective rights are assigned to social roles and natural kinds in accordance with 
the role/kind-normative attributions of desires (see the Kind-Desire Theory in 
Chapter I.).  
Part Two investigates the function of virtue acquisition when it comes to 
protective rights. To be more specific, I will argue that while some protective 
rights, namely most children’s rights, lead to the development of virtues through 
protecting children’s essential needs, other protective rights, concretely 
promissory rights and the power-right to promise, function as enabling rights, and 
therefore their function of virtue acquisition is explained by the heuristic model 
of virtues. 
I concentrate solely on children’s rights and promissory rights because these 
are the paradigmatic counterexamples to the Will Theory and the Interest Theory, 
respectively. As will be illustrated, Will theorists fail to describe and justify the 
rights of children for most of these rights are unwaivable rights which do not 
provide the right-holder with a choice of being waived. The Kind-Desire Theory 
avoids this issue by pinpointing children’s role/kind-based desires that certain 
duties (e.g., duties not to ill-treat children and to care for children) are fulfilled 
by others. As Wenar (2013) argues, so long as such desires are recognised as norms 
and those duties are enforced by existing systems of norms, children hold 
correlative claim-rights. Since Wenar’s analysis does not justify rights-ascriptions 
(i.e., it does not tell us why some children’s role/kind-based desires should be 
recognised as norms and protected by rights), my next task is to elaborate the 
virtue-based justification of children’s rights.    
Many Interest theorists, on the other hand, have had difficulty describing 
and justifying promissory rights. Given that rights, on their account, protect and 
further the right-holder’s interests, any promisee who is, due to carelessness or 
ignorance, mistaken about his or her interests when accepting the promise is a 
counterexample to the Interest Theory. Suppose that X accepts Y’s promise that 
, and that the performance of  makes X worse off. This does not seem to 
undermine the fact that Y is held under the promissory duty to X that  (Wenar 
2008, 2015). The Kind-Desire Theory does not face this issue because promissory 
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rights are assigned to the role of a promisee in accordance with the role-based 
desire that promisors keep promises which neither refers to nor depends on 
individuals’ psychological states. The last chapter of this dissertation offers the 
virtue-based justification of promissory rights and the power-right to promise. 
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CHAPTER IV. CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
Most normative theories that justify rights-ascriptions to children base this 
justification on the protection of children’s essential needs and well-being or 
welfare. We commonly believe that children need this protection due to their 
condition of childhood, usually understood as the condition of vulnerability, 
incapacity and innocence, which constantly undergoes development and requires 
support, nurture and love. As David William Archard puts it, ‘the modern child is 
an innocent incompetent who is not but must become the adult’ (Archard 2004: 
50). 
 Accordingly, most children’s rights are protective rather than enabling 
rights, because they protect children’s (role/kind-based) desires pinpointed by 
role/kind-normative attributions (see the Kind-Desire Theory in Chapter I. and the 
distinction between enabling and protective rights in Chapter III.). It follows that 
the Interest Theory of rights, according to which rights protect and further the 
right-holder’s interests interpreted as well-being or welfare, is one of the most 
prevailing descriptive as well as justificatory accounts of children’s rights. One 
aim of this chapter is to argue that even though the virtue-based justification of 
children’s rights elaborated here is a complement to the Interest Theory, it does 
not lose its justificatory force.  
 As explained in Chapter I., we cannot answer the question of what rights 
children have unless we justify our different explanations of what children, qua 
children and human beings, desire and why such desires should be protected by 
rights. Consequently, another aim of this chapter is to elaborate the virtue-based 
justification of children’s rights. I will argue that there are at least three 
fundamental rights of children which protect children’s essential needs (the right 
not to be harmed, abused and neglected, the right to be nurtured, cared for and 
loved, and the right to education). This protection, as will be illustrated, secures 
children’s healthy mental and physical development, which, in turn, protects and 
furthers their capacity for virtue acquisition. In other words, by protecting 
children’s essential needs, the fundamental rights make children more virtuous. I 
shall also argue that people who have developed and practised virtues are more 
likely to find happiness (regarded here as a synonym for well-being) throughout 
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their lives. Therefore, the fundamental rights of children also protect and further 
children’s happiness (well-being). 
 Some theories of rights do not consider children as holders of rights. I will 
assert that such theories conflict with the fact and that any critique of some right-
ascription to children cannot be derived from the assumption that children are 
not right-holders. However, one’s capacity for holding rights does not always 
clarify why one ought (not) to have certain rights. Put differently, although people 
can be ascribed any right, it might be morally wrong to ascribe some rights to 
some people. Accordingly, my final aim in this chapter is to argue that children 
lack some role-based rights and that they should not be ascribed certain liberty 
rights, since such rights are in contradiction with their fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, I will also explain why adults do not possess the fundamental rights. 
 To achieve my aims, I start with a short overview of the main theoretical 
approaches to children’s rights. This section should clarify why theories 
recognising children’s rights but not ascribing all rights to children are less 
controversial than other accounts. Secondly, I elaborate the virtue-based 
justification of the three fundamental rights of children. Thirdly, I explicate why 
this justificatory account complements the Interest Theory rather than the Will 
Theory. Finally, I argue that children should not be ascribed certain rights and 
that adults do not hold the fundamental rights of children. 
 
10. A short overview of the main theoretical standpoints 
There are many theoretical approaches to children’s rights in the literature. 
Despite multifarious differences amongst these approaches, they all seem to be 
united by the attempt to answer two chief questions: (1) Are children capable of 
having rights? (Do they qualify as right-holders?), and, if they can have rights, (2) 
What (sort of) rights do children have? The two questions imply following possible 
answers which, as I am about to illustrate, are reflected in the literature: 
1. Are children capable of having rights? 
1.1.  No 
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1.2.  Yes 
 
2. What (sort of) rights do children have? 
2.1.  Children have all the rights that adults have. 
2.2.  Children have all the rights that adults have and, on top of 
that, they have some special rights that adults do not have. 
2.3.  Children have only some rights that adults have. 
2.4.  Children have only some rights that adults have, however they 
have also some special rights that adults do not have.  
Some philosophers (e.g., Hart 1955) have argued that children cannot have 
rights because they do not qualify as the right-holder. They claim that children 
lack autonomy and/or rationality or are less capable than adults in other aspects, 
such as their lack of experience or overall cognitive abilities. In any case, 
children’s incapacity implies that they cannot be (completely) responsible for 
their actions, and thus they cannot be considered as moral and legal agents. Since 
moral and legal agency is essential for the possession of rights, children have no 
rights. 
 The conclusion that children have no rights is rather controversial for two 
reasons. First, we have a very deep conviction that children have rights. Second, 
children have been ascribed rights at least since the year 1924, when the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child was accepted by the League of Nations. The 
Declaration was then adopted in an extended form by the United Nations in 1959, 
which served as the basis for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child thirty years later. Therefore, any theory of rights that does not recognise 
children as the right-holder seems to conflict with the fact. Obviously, the theorist 
can argue that despite the fact that children have been assigned rights, they 
should not have these (perhaps all) rights. However, this argumentation cannot 
work on the assertion that children are not right-holders due to their lack of the 
capacity for holding rights. It follows that any relevant criticism of children’s 
rights must see children as right-holders and then defend the claim that children 
should not have some or even all rights. 
 On the other hand, many philosophers maintain that children hold rights. 
For the sake of clarity, let me distinguish between liberty and welfare rights. 
Liberty rights concern people’s choices, such as how and whether to vote, whether 
to practice a religion and which one, etc. Welfare rights protect people’s essential 
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interests and needs, such as health, privacy, etc. (Archard 2004, 2014), and they 
have been referred to as protective rights in this dissertation. Accordingly, some 
scholars argue that children (should) have both liberty and welfare rights, whereas 
other claim that children (should) be ascribed only welfare rights.  
According to libertionists, children ought to be assigned welfare as well as 
liberty rights, i.e., they should have all the rights that adults have. Libertionism 
works on the assumption that children are the last oppressed social group deprived 
of rights in the same way as women and some race minorities used to be (Federle 
1993, 1995). This deprivation is grounded in the constructed concept of capacity 
that has been central to our understanding of the right-holder for centuries (Cohen 
1980, Federle 1993, 1995). No libertionist, I believe, would deny that children, 
especially very young children, are incapable of certain things and actions. Their 
main aim is to highlight the fact that we define who is the right-holder and that 
our definitions largely exclude children from the status of a right-holder. 
Consequently, we must come up with theories of rights that are not based on such 
definitions, for the only way to liberate children and treat them with the same 
respect as we treat adults is to give them equal rights. 
There are many different explanations of libertionism which differ mainly 
in theorists’ approaches to paternalism when considering children’s liberty. 
Different approaches mirror how much paternalism the theorist is willing to assign 
to parents (caregivers generally), other adults and to the state in their relations 
with children. For some libertionists, neither parents nor other adults nor the 
state can ever be justified in any degree of paternalism (Federle 1993, 1995).14 
However, this seems controversial too. Nobody, I firmly believe, ought to allow 
very young children to drink alcohol or chew tobacco because there is a great 
                                         
14 As far as I know, there is no philosopher who would claim that children have all 
the rights adults have and, on top of that, that they have some extra rights. In fact, 
I can think only of some special welfare rights, such as the right to be nurtured and 
cared for, the right to be loved, etc. However, these rights are essentially derived 
from children’s special status: their inability to provide for themselves food, 
shelter, etc. This brings back the concept of capacity into the concept of the right-
holder, which is unacceptable for liberationists. Furthermore, anyone who defends 
this position would also need to explain the relationship between children’s liberty 
rights and the provider’s duties to meet such children’s needs (interests) correlating 
with their special (welfare) rights. 
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chance of poisoning that can harm the child. To let some young child drink alcohol 
or chew tobacco is without doubt wrong, and therefore some degree of 
paternalism is clearly justified in certain cases. Yet, any acknowledgment of some 
degree of paternalism must lead to the conclusion that children should not have 
all the rights (especially some liberty rights) that adults have, which is in fact the 
disconfirmation of libertionism. 
Since the two above-mentioned approaches towards children’s rights 
(children have no rights and children have all rights) are implausible, the view 
that children have rights bud should not be ascribed all rights must be less 
questionable. Philosophers defending this standpoint base their argumentations 
also on children’s incapacity, which can be marked out in different ways. The 
most common way is the age limit stating when someone can qualify as the holder 
of certain rights. In some Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions, for example, fourteen-
year olds can obtain a driving license, but they need to be at least eighteen years 
old to be legally capable of buying and consuming alcohol and tobacco. The second 
most widely used way to highlight children’s incapacity is to assign them only 
welfare rights. There are many reasons (not necessarily good ones) for denying 
children liberty rights. Children’s lack of autonomy, as mentioned above, or their 
poor judgements regarding long-term well-being (preferring sweets to healthy 
food, playing with friends to going to school, etc.) are amongst the most 
prominent reasons in theories of children’s rights. Many Interest theorists (e.g., 
MacCormick 1982, Kramer 1998) use either one or both ways to determine what 
sort of rights children have. 
Finally, some philosophers assert that children should not be assigned all 
the rights that adults hold, however children also possess special rights, grounded 
in their condition of childhood, which adults do not have. Joel Feinberg (1980) is 
the best-known defender of this approach. In his work, Feinberg divides rights into 
three categories: (1) rights held only by adults (mostly liberty rights), (2) rights 
held by both adults and children (mostly welfare rights and some liberty rights), 
(3) and rights held only by children (special welfare rights). Such special welfare 
rights secure that children receive goods they are unable to secure for themselves 
(e.g., the right to food and shelter), or protect children against ill-treatment 
(e.g., the right not to be abused and neglected), or satisfy their essential needs 
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(e.g., the right to be loved) (Feinberg 1980, Archard 2014). I believe that this final 
approach towards children’s rights is correct and I will defend it in the last two 
sections of this chapter.  
 
11. The virtue-based justification of children’s rights 
The most important rights of children, special welfare (protective) rights, are 
grounded in the condition of childhood and protect children’s essential needs and 
well-being. Such protective rights, as will be illustrated, have also other functions. 
They protect and further children’s capacity for virtue acquisition, and hence they 
make children more virtuous. Those rights also further children’s happiness 
throughout their lives. To highlight their importance, I am going to call them 
‘fundamental rights’. There are, I propose, three fundamental rights of children: 
(1) the right not to be harmed, neglected and abused, (2) the right to be nurtured, 
cared for and loved, and (3) the right to education. The list need not be definite 
and other rights might be added, however I concentrate only on those three rights 
here. 
 The fundamental rights of children are grounded in the condition of 
childhood. Childhood is often understood as the condition of vulnerability, 
incapability and innocence, which constantly undergoes development and requires 
protection, nurturing and love:  
‘The modern conception of childhood is neither simple nor a 
straightforwardly coherent one, since it is constituted by different 
theoretical understandings and cultural representations. The 
conception is a very modern one inasmuch as literature has treated of 
childhood for only two hundred years, and science one hundred. Both, 
in essence, see the child as having a separate nature and inhabiting a 
separate world. … In sum, the modern child is an innocent incompetent 
who is not but must become the adult. The “must” conveys both the 
necessity of human development and the ideal character of maturity.’ 
(Archard 2004: 49-50) 
‘Childhood is the time for children to be in school and at play, to grow 
strong and confident with the love and encouragement of their family 
and an extended community of caring adults. It is a precious time in 
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which children should live free from fear, safe from violence and 
protected from abuse and exploitation. As such, childhood means much 
more than just the space between birth and the attainment of 
adulthood. It refers to the state and condition of a child’s life, to the 
quality of those years.’ (UNICEF – Childhood Defined 2005) 
Furthermore, according to Wenar’s Kind-Desire Theory, children are 
members of both a social (familial) institution and species (humankind). It 
follows that children have both role-based (social) and kind-based 
(biological) desires, which might or might not be separated. When I talk 
about children’s essential needs derived from their condition of childhood, I 
refer to social and biological desires without any further distinguishing. 
Considering the characteristic features of childhood, I assert that children, 
qua children, desire to be nurtured, cared for, loved, and supported in their 
development, that is, on their way to become adults. 
 
11.1. Protecting children’s essential needs and virtue acquisition 
I believe that we all have, though to different degrees, the capacity for 
virtue acquisition and that this capacity develops throughout our lives. 
However, I also believe that the most crucial stages of this development 
occur in childhood. As will be illustrated, unhappy conditions and defects of 
mental and physical health can limit the range of virtues someone can 
acquire. Autistic and severely handicapped people are presumably unable to 
develop many virtues. Despite the fact that the capacity for virtue 
acquisition is held to different degrees, it is a human capacity. 
 Childhood, as explained, is defined by vulnerability, incapability and 
innocence. It is a special condition which undergoes constant development 
while transforming children into adults. Consequently, children’s essential 
needs, derived from their condition of childhood, are needs that are vital to 
this development. To be more precise, their essential needs define what the 
normal and healthy development is. Therefore, rights that protect children’s 
essential needs also protect and secure children’s normal and healthy 
development. Given that someone’s mental and physical health affects that 
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person’s capacity for virtue acquisition, the fundamental rights of children 
also protect and further their capacity. This section demonstrates how the 
possession of such children’s rights makes the right-holder more virtuous. 
There is an enormous amount of empirical data giving us an evidence that 
our mental and physical health is closely connected to supportive social 
experiences we receive from close relationships (Mineo 2017). The way we are 
supported and treated have significant impacts on our mental and physical health 
right from our birth (Perry 2002, Tarullo 2012, Glaser 2014), and what we 
experience in very early life has one of the most formative effects on our 
biological and social development (Perry 2002, Tarullo 2012, Glaser 2014, Narvaez 
2015, 2016). No wonder that the relationship between parents (caregivers) and 
children has been the subject of much research into developmental psychology. 
This research suggests that there are direct links between the supportive 
environment and healthy, self-confident, morally and emotionally cultivated 
individuals (Narvaez 2015, 2016, Thompson 2015).     
Any parent-child relationship has arguably some good and bad impacts on 
the both parties of this relationship. The problem arises when the bad effects start 
to predominate. Research into child abuse and neglect has clearly shown that a 
child maltreatment has severe impacts on the victim’s psychological, physical, 
cognitive, and behavioural development. Amongst the most evident consequences 
are chronic low-esteem, attentional problems, learning disorders, poop peer 
relations, as well as brain damage (Panel on Research on Child Abuse and Neglect, 
National Research Council 1993).  
The most recent research into brain development has revealed why early 
abuse and neglect might affect heavily the child’s later adjustment. It is a well-
known fact that human babies are helpless and immature at birth. They emerge 
from the womb nine to eighteen months earlier than babies of other mammals, 
meaning that human babies have approximately 75 percent of the brain left to be 
developed outside the womb over next twenty years, though most of it is 
developed by the age of five (Tarullo 2012, Narvaez 2015). This development, as 
Danya Glaser points out, is also shaped by children’s individual experiences: 
61 
 
‘While the sequence of development within the brain is genetically 
determined, the nature of this development is determined to a 
considerable extent on the young child's experiences. The absence of 
some experiences, such as extreme deprivation during sensitive periods 
of development may mean that certain functions will not develop. For 
most functions, the nature of experience will shape brain development. 
Negative experiences and certain ways of interaction will be 
incorporated into the brain's connectivity. While learning and new 
experiences continue throughout life, and their effects continue to be 
incorporated into brain structure and functioning, previous patterns 
cannot be erased, only added on to and more slowly.’ (Glaser 2014: 
abstract). 
Negative experiences, to conclude, that children have while interacting with their 
parents and other people in early life do have severe impacts on their brain 
development. Such effects will arguably affect many (perhaps all) other aspects 
of human development.  
Furthermore, young maltreated children tend to display a significant 
amount of neurobiological stress, whereas children who have experienced a 
secured attachment to parents appear to be protected from developing the worst 
effects of the stress response (Perry 2002). Many empirical studies suggest that 
the child’s experiences interact with the child’s genetic resilience or vulnerability 
(Perry 2002, Tarullo 2012, Glaser 2014). This conclusion is also supported by 
ongoing research into epigenetic, the branch of science studying how one’s 
environment affect one’s gene expression. It is now a well-known fact that genes 
provide only a blueprint requiring certain experiences for gene expressions to 
occur (Lussier, Islam, Kobor 2018). For example, rut pups which lack a normal 
nurturing mother (supportive environment) in the first ten days of life, the period 
of time when the proper gene expression for controlling anxiety is switched on, 
may never be able to express this gene. Consequently, whenever such ruts face 
new situations, the situations will cause anxiety for a lifetime (Meaney 2001, 
2010).   
John Locke once said that at birth the human mind is a tabula rasa or blank 
slate, ready to be written all over by experience. Not only does the research into 
developmental psychology and neuroscience support Locke’s statement, it has 
also demonstrated that our experiences go much deeper into us, for they affect 
the very brain structure as well as gene expressions. In other words, such 
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experiences do not only write all over our mind, they are inscribed into our 
physical body too. It shows us how vulnerable and formative children are, as well 
as how a child ill-treatment and neglect lead to the child’s poor physical and 
mental health, including chronic low-esteem, attentional problems, learning 
disorders, poor peer relations, and brain damage, to name some of the most 
evident and detected consequences of a child maltreatment. 
It follows that the experience of supportive and loving environments is one 
of the most essential needs children have, because such experiences are necessary 
for children’s normal and healthy development as human beings. Moreover, some 
developmental psychologists argue that positive experiences and the normal 
(healthy) development are crucial for the child’s moral development. Ross A. 
Thompson (2015) asserts that even very young children develop a ‘premoral 
sensibility’, derived from their non-egocentric awareness of the effects of one’s 
conduct on other people’s feelings, aims and needs. This premoral sensibility is 
then constantly refined in parent-child interactions into a system of moral values 
and the child’s self-awareness as a moral agent. ‘[V]irtue…is nurtured in the 
context of [parent-child] relationships that exemplify, as well as discuss, 
responsiveness and support’ (Thompson 2015: 299). In addition, Darcia Narvaez 
(2015, 2016) points out, based on her research, that the ways of early caregiving, 
such as touch frequency, the length of breastfeeding, the amount of given 
attention, etc., affect the individual’s capacity for virtue acquisition. Narvaez 
also argues that chances of acquiring virtues are significantly improved when one 
has a good mental and physical health and lives in the supportive environment. 
All these empirical studies demonstrating how children’s experiences affect 
their development give us an evidence that children are extremely sensitive to 
the ways they are treated, and that these ways have impacts on children’s 
capacity for virtue acquisition. It has been asserted that people hold this capacity 
to different degrees and that people who are mentally and/or physically 
handicapped are unable to acquire certain virtues. In other words, there are links 
between the development of our capacity for virtue acquisition and our mental 
and physical development. Accordingly, it seems that rights which protect 
children’s essential needs also protect and further their capacity to acquire 
virtues.  
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 Considering that the fundamental rights of children are grounded in the 
condition of childhood, it follows that those rights are justified by their protection 
of children’s normal (healthy) mental, physical and moral development. This 
implies that children have rights to experience the supportive and loving 
environment as well as rights against negative experiences. Since negative 
experiences are mainly caused by a child ill-treatment understood in terms of 
‘harm’, ‘abuse’ and ‘neglect’, all children have the fundamental right not to be 
harmed, abused and neglected. Given that positive experiences are captured 
(though not exhaustively) by terms of ‘nurture’, ‘care’ and ‘love’, all children 
have the fundamental right to be nurtured, cared for, and loved.  
Furthermore, the child’s need for the supportive environment is not 
restricted only to one’s nuclear family, but to the society as whole. One of the 
most important social institutions that play an essential role in the transformation 
of children into adults is an education system, and I believe that each society has 
the moral duty to provide all its children with education. Accordingly, all children 
have the fundamental right to education. Education socialises children and equip 
them with an essential knowledge and skills guiding children through their lives. 
It is meant to transform children into functioning (ideally well-functioning) 
members of the society by transmitting basic social norms, values and practical 
skills. To function well as a member of the society means to occupy social roles 
and refrain from conducting negative social deviance. It follows that education 
provide children with the common knowledge of social roles. Given that virtues 
are developed by perfecting social roles, education has also direct impacts on 
children’s capacity for virtue acquisition. 
To sum up, the three fundamental rights of children have several functions. 
They protect children’s essential needs, which, as I have argued, implies that they 
also secure children’s healthy mental, physical and moral development. The 
protection of this healthy development justifies the existence of such rights, and 
the function of virtue acquisition is an important part of this justification. Put 
differently, one of the main reasons why children should not have negative 
experiences is that such experiences restrict the capacity for virtue acquisition, 
and one of the main reasons why children must experience the supportive and 
loving environment is that these experiences further that capacity. As I am about 
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to demonstrate, the function of virtue acquisition in the case of children’s rights 
has also direct impacts on children’s ability to find happiness throughout their 
lives. 
 
11.2. Virtues and happiness 
There is a common belief that children’s rights protect and further children’s well-
being or welfare. I take the terms ‘well-being’ and ‘welfare’ to be synonymous 
with happiness or flourishing (terms widely used in virtue ethics). In this section, 
I argue that by protecting and furthering the capacity for virtue acquisition, the 
fundamental rights of children also protect and further children’s happiness 
throughout their lives. I have no intention to attempt to define happiness, since 
it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to do so. However, I will demonstrate 
that there are direct links between happiness and virtues. 
 Most virtue ethicists since Aristotle have argued that virtues are the key to 
happiness. To illustrate why virtues are so essential to our flourishing, I highlight 
three aspects of human life that relate to happiness and argue that the way people 
approach such aspects as well as their success within these aspects depend on 
virtues and vices those individuals have developed. 
Good interpersonal relationships. People are happy when they have good 
interpersonal relationships and our ability to succeed in establishing and 
maintaining good ties is the key to our happiness. For nearly 80 years, researchers 
from Harvard University have studied the lives of the same group of men, 
recording details about their physical and mental health, their employment, 
families and friendships every two years. The aim of this research was to provide 
insight into what factors led to a good life. After analysing an enormous amount 
of data, the research has revealed that close relationships, more than anything 
else, are what keep people happy throughout their lives. ‘Those ties protect 
people from life’s discontents, help to delay mental and physical decline, and are 
better predictors of long and happy lives than social class, IQ, or even genes’ 
(Mineo 2017). To have good interpersonal relationships, we must put effort into 
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maintaining them, because all good relationships develop over a period of long 
time and demand a great amount of care. There is no doubt that people who have 
developed honesty, kindness, fairness, and care are more successful in 
establishing and maintaining good ties than those who are notoriously dishonest, 
unkind, unfair, and uncaring. 
Functioning well as a member of the society. Human beings are social 
animals, and therefore people tend to be happy when they thrive in the society 
or become its valuable members. As Dan P. McAdams (2015) points out, our 
survival and reproduction have always depended on success in social life consisting 
of social acceptance and social status.  
‘This is why social exclusion and loss of status are among the most 
painful experiences human being can know today, for being excluded 
from the group, or downgraded in status, has throughout evolutionary 
history often led to death, or at best a significant decline in 
reproductive fitness.’ (McAdams 2015: 310) 
Both social acceptance and social status, as McAdams argues, are influenced by 
social reputation, constructed in accordance with one’s character as perceived by 
others. Adjectives, such as trustworthy, kind, unfriendly, etc., are used daily to 
describe and appraise other members of the society. Such descriptions and 
assessments are meant to help us to decide whether or not we should establish or 
maintain already established relationships and interactions with those people. 
Since any human society requires some amount of cooperation and organisation, 
it seems that social reputation affects people’s ability to interact with others. To 
thrive in a society, one must succeed in creating social networks that readily 
circulate one’s social reputation and constantly create new social opportunities. 
Virtues are essential to our capability of earning a good social reputation, and 
therefore they are also necessary for functioning well as a member of the society.  
Construction of individual life stories. As we age, we are more and more 
inclined to reflect on how we have lived. One important implication of this 
reflection, as McAdams (2015) illustrates, is our construction of individual life 
stories. According to McAdams, creating life stories gives us broader and more 
meaningful perspectives on our lives. A life story constitutes an individual’s 
narrative identity connecting the past self with the present self in order to guide 
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through the future self. Furthermore, such stories are psychological as well as 
moral projects, for they mirror our understanding of the good and the truth 
(McAdams 2015). I believe that people who are satisfied with their own, more 
truthful stories tend to be happier than those who are either unsatisfied or have 
fabricated their stories to their satisfaction. I also believe that virtues play an 
important role in constructing more truthful stories. Virtues, as defined, are 
character traits and qualities that make us better people in general. It follows 
that virtues enable us to remain consistent through constantly changing 
environments. In other words, virtues provide a personal integrity which 
determines, to a large degree, the ways we cope with difficult situations and 
moral dilemmas encountered throughout our lives. When constructing individual 
life stories, virtues help us to find meaningful and more integral contents of our 
lives. Consequently, virtues secure more authentic constructions of life stories, 
and hence lead to happiness. 
To conclude, the above-mentioned three aspects of human life (good 
interpersonal relationships, being a valuable member of society, and constructing 
own life stories) are the essential sources of human happiness. Different people 
approach these aspects differently and attach them different values. Despite 
these differences, whether or not people thrive in such aspects depends on their 
possession of virtues. Thus, virtues are essential to happiness. Given that the 
fundamental rights of children protect and further children’s capacity for virtue 
acquisition, such rights also protect and further children’s happiness throughout 
their lives by improving the chances of developing as many virtues as possible (and 
perhaps reaching the fully virtuous agency). 
 
12. The virtue-based justification and the Interest Theory 
The upshot of the previous section is that there are at least three fundamental 
rights of children, which are grounded in the condition of childhood, and that 
these rights have a plurality of functions. They protect children’s essential needs 
in order to secure their normal and healthy development. The fundamental rights 
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of children also protect and further children’s capacity for virtue acquisition, 
which, in turn, furthers their happiness throughout their lives.  
All these functions can be explained by the claim that children’s rights 
protect and further children’s interests (well-being). Consequently, the virtue-
based justification elaborated here is a complement to the Interest Theory of 
rights. This does not imply that I must accept the Interest Theory as the only 
descriptive and justificatory account here as well as in other cases. As Wenar 
argues, the Kind-Desire Theory, which is used as the descriptive account of rights 
in this dissertation, is compatible with the Interest Theory, yet does not face its 
counterexamples. For the term ‘desire’ embraces the term ‘interest’ but the 
latter is understood as the right-holder’s well-being only when it comes to 
children’s rights and human and animal rights: 
‘Yet this is the direction of fit only for this new class of right-holders, 
not for most cases. … The mistake of the Interest Theory is to take the 
analysis of these latecomers (detheologized humans, children, animals, 
etc.) as its paradigm, and to attempt to explain rights-ascriptions 
beyond these cases with the independent value of well-being.’ (Wenar 
2013: 227)  
Furthermore, the virtue-based justification of children’s rights does not 
conflict with the justificatory reasons given by the Interest theorist. One possible 
difference between those two justifications lies in my interpretation of essential 
needs as needs that are necessary for the normal and healthy development, and 
of well-being as happiness or flourishing. Another difference can be found in the 
fact that rights, on my account, have several functions, and therefore there might 
be more than only one justificatory reason for rights-ascriptions. Nevertheless, 
the point is that the function of virtue acquisition in the case of children’s rights 
is included in the function of protecting and furthering the right-holder’s interests 
considered as well-being. Although the virtue-based justification complements 
the Interest Theory of rights, it does not lose its justificatory force.    
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13. The Will Theory of children’s rights 
As explained in Chapter I., there is another widely accepted theory of rights, the 
Will Theory. The virtue-based justification of children’s rights is not a complement 
to the Will Theory because its conceptual realm does not allow us to describe 
children’s rights. More precisely, Will theorists have had difficulty describing and 
justifying children’s rights for a long time. Its two most prominent defenders, H. 
L. A. Hart and Hillel Steiner, have attempted to resolve this problem in order to 
vindicate the Will Theory. Yet, I argue in this section that they have failed to do 
so, and therefore the Will Theory still faces the same issue.              
According to Hart (1983) and Steiner (1998), the right-holder is ‘a small-
scale sovereign’ who is owed the duty consisting either in performing some action 
(a duty to do ) or refraining from some action (a duty not to do ). Such a small-
scale sovereign gains control over the duty of another due to his/her ability to 
decide whether the performance of that duty will be waived or enforced. Based 
on Hohfeldian analysis, this power is linked with liberty (privilege), or more 
precisely with paired-privilege, which explains the right-holder’s ability to decide 
or choose to waive or enforce the fulfilment of the duty. (Note that the Will Theory 
is also known as the Choice Theory.) As stated before, X has a paired-privilege if 
and only if X has both no duty not to do  (in this case, to waive or enforce the 
duty) and no duty to  (waive or enforce the duty). In other words, rights give 
their holders control over the duty of another, which resides in the right-holder’s 
discretion (choices), and they protect these choices, that is, the right-holder’s 
liberty. 
For Hart (1955), the right-holder’s liberty relates essentially to one’s 
autonomy. There is, on Hart’s account, only one natural (moral) right, ‘the equal 
right to all men to be free’ (Hart 1955: 175), which serves as the fundamental 
right from which all other rights, ‘derivative rights’, are derived. Though Hart 
speaks of the equal right to all men to be free, not everyone holds this 
fundamental right. To qualify as its holder, one must have the capacity for 
autonomous choices or autonomous agency. It follows that beings who lack this 
capacity cannot hold the fundamental right. Since all other rights are derivative 
rights, it also implies that such beings have no rights at all. Accordingly, children, 
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mentally handicapped people, the comatose, the dead as well as the future 
generations and animals are excluded from the status of a right-holder, and hence 
deprived of rights. Hart asserts that although people have a moral duty not to ill-
treat such non-autonomous beings, this duty does not correlate with any right, 
and we should not use the term ‘right’ in its proper meaning here (Hart 1955: 
181). As will be explained later, Hart (1983) eventually reviewed and changed his 
view on rights-ascriptions to non-autonomous beings. 
However, the problem of describing children’s rights arises even if we do 
not place emphasis on the concept of autonomy and focus only on the right-
holder’s control over the duty of another. Since most children’s rights are welfare 
(protective) rights, these rights cannot be waived. Think of the right not to be 
harmed, neglected and abused. Children can neither release other people from 
their duty not to ill-treat them, nor to enforce the performance of that duty. 
Consequently, children seem to lack the control over the duty of another. There 
is another, yet related issue for the Will Theory called the issue of unwaivable 
rights and duties. A typical example of an unwaivable right is the citizen’s right 
not to be assaulted. In most modern states, citizens are protected by the criminal 
law, imposing the duty not to assault on all citizens. Yet, the criminal law does 
not allow citizens to waive their right. That is, citizens also seem to lack the 
control over the duty of another. Given that the only function of rights is to 
provide the right-holder with this control, any consistent advocate of the Will 
Theory must conclude that citizens do not have the right not to be assaulted and 
that children do not hold the right not to be harmed, neglected and abused. Such 
conclusions are without doubt in conflict with the fact, for both citizens and 
children have been assigned such rights in many states all over the world.    
Both Hart (1983) and Steiner (1998, 2008) have endeavoured to explicate 
these problematic cases in order to justify the Will Theory. As mentioned, Hart 
eventually changed his view and claimed that non-autonomous beings can hold 
rights if and only if the control over correlative duties is exercised on their behalf 
by appointed representatives. This, I believe, is unconvincing. It has been asserted 
that most children’s rights (as well as the rights of mentally handicapped people, 
the comatose, etc.) are welfare (protective) rights that exist to protect their 
essential needs and well-being. This protection often consists in securing certain 
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types of care. One characteristic feature of such welfare rights is that the right-
holder is usually unable to waive these rights securing some required care and 
protection. It must follow that neither children, nor their appointed 
representatives have the control over duties which correlate with most rights of 
children. To solve the issue, Hart must resolve the problem of unwaivable rights 
and duties too. Since he asserts that unwaivable rights and duties are rare cases 
which cannot be explained by the Will Theory (Hart 1983: 188-193), Hart fails to 
ascribe rights to children.  
Hillel Steiner (1998) disagrees with Hart and claim that his explanation of 
the Will Theory avoids the both problems. His solution lies in locating rights in the 
so-called ‘power-possessors’ or ‘superior state officials’, who hold the actual 
authority (power) to waive and enforce duties in those problematic cases. In other 
words, the rights of children are not held by children, but by the relevant state 
officials. The same applies to citizens’ right not to be assaulted. The law, as 
Steiner points out, always empowers some people within the hierarchical power-
structure of the state to be capable of waiving or enforcing these seemingly 
unwaivable rights. This implies, Steiner concludes, that there are in fact no 
unwaivable rights and duties (Steiner 1998: 251-262).15  
 Wenar has questioned Steiner’s solution for it conflicts with our ordinary 
understanding of rights (Wenar 2008). To see its implausibility, we need to 
introduce the distinction between directed and undirected duties. Directed duties 
are duties that one person owes to another person, who would be wronged if the 
duty were violated. On the other hand, violating undirected duties is wrong, but 
it does not wrong anyone in particular (Cruft 2013, May 2015). If we admit that 
there is a moral duty not to ill-treat children (as Hart does), we must be inclined 
to think that this duty is directed towards children. Moreover, we commonly 
believe that whenever someone violates the directed duty not to ill-treat children, 
it is some particular child who is wronged. Accordingly, the connection between 
                                         
15 It is important to highlight the difference between Hart’s appointed 
representatives and Steiner’s power-possessors, who can also be seen as appointed 
representatives. In Hart’s case, children, not appointed representatives, are holders 
of children’s rights, whereas on Steiner’s account these rights are held by power-
possessors. 
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the duty not to ill-treat children and children’s right not to be ill-treated seems 
to be lost when the right is held by someone else than children.  
To demonstrate the point, imagine a moral community (a system of moral 
norms) that has power to decide what is morally right and wrong. The community 
ascribes moral rights and duties to its members in accordance with its decisions, 
and it has decided that all its members have the duty not to ill-treat children. If 
Steiner is right, the correlative right that children are not ill-treated is held by 
the community (i.e., its relevant power-possessors), since only the community has 
the actual control over the duty. That is, only the community can either cancel 
the duty or modify any of its details (e.g., that the duty is imposed only on some 
instead of all members of the community). Even though the community is the 
actual power-possessor here, we do not think that it is the community, not some 
particular child, that is wronged by violating the duty not to ill-treat children. 
This holds true for the directed duty not to assault fellow citizens as well, 
for we believe that any violation of this duty wrongs some particular citizen, not 
the community (or the institution of law). Therefore, I agree with Wenar’s 
assertion that Steiner’s solution contradicts an ordinary understanding of rights. 
Will theorists, to conclude, are unable to describe (not to mention justify) 
children’s rights, and this inability stems from the assumption that rights have 
only one function consisting in providing the right-holder with the control over the 
duty of another. Therefore, the only way how the Will theorist can overcome the 
issue is to admit that rights have more than one function.  
 
14. Should children be assigned all rights? 
Children’s rights, as argued, are grounded in children’s condition of childhood, 
seen as the condition of vulnerability, incapacity and innocence, constantly 
undergoing development and requiring protection, nurture and love. Given this 
understanding of childhood, many adults how somehow ambiguous feelings about 
ascribing certain rights to children.  
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What amount of liberty, we frequently ask, should children be given? There 
is no doubt that providing children with a greater amount of liberty is overall a 
good thing to do, since they might feel more respected and thereby more equal. 
Furthermore, they may perhaps develop certain qualities that go hand in hand 
with liberty, such as moderation and accountability. On the other hand, it is 
equally obvious that too much liberty can and often does harm children (especially 
very young children). Consequently, we tend to believe that children must be 
prevented from doing things that would harm them. In this section, I clarify why 
children do not hold certain role-based rights and why they should not be ascribed 
some liberty rights. If one of the main functions of rights is to make the right-
holder more virtuous, and considering that children possess the capacity for virtue 
acquisition, why should any right be denied to children? Would children not 
become more virtuous if they were given a greater amount of liberty and could 
occupy more social roles?  
 Consider children’s inability to occupy certain social roles first. As 
explained in Chapter I., rights are ascribed to social roles. It follows that people’s 
capacity to hold such rights depends on their ability to occupy these social roles. 
Whether or not someone can occupy a social role is contingent on existing 
limitations that determine who is able to occupy that role. There are many 
different types of limitations, such as natural limitations (including physical and 
mental incapacities), cultural and national limitations, as well as economic and 
legal limitations. Imagine, for instance, people who faint from seeing blood. Such 
people are naturally unable to carry out the task of taking samples of blood for 
blood tests. Think also about people who are forced to immigrate to other 
countries and, as a result of their immigration, are denied some political roles and 
role-based rights because of their cultural and/or national background. 
Consequently, Brennan and Noggle (1998) assert that there is nothing 
controversial about the statement that children do not hold all the role-based 
rights, since adults do not have equal role-based rights either. Doctors, for 
instance, have rights that their patients do not possess, and only judges have the 
right to sentence criminals. When it comes to children, their inability to occupy 
social roles is derived especially from their physical and mental incapacities, as 
well as from the age limit in the society and their lack of knowledge and/or 
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training required by such social roles. A child who cannot speak, write and read 
can be hardly asked to sign a contract and, therefore, be held under contractual 
duties. The point is that the unequal distribution of role-based rights between 
children and adults, as well as amongst different adults, is one essential aspect of 
our reality of social roles. 
Not only do children lack some role-based rights, they, I believe, should be 
denied certain liberty rights too. As Archard (2014) explains, most liberty rights, 
such as rights to marry, to have sex, whether to practise religion and which one, 
etc., are derived from the human right of self-determination. Since children are 
not commonly seen as holders of those liberty rights, it seems that they do not 
possess the human right of self-determination (Archard 2014). However, there is 
(at least) one essential liberty right derived from this human right, namely the 
right to choose a career path, which is less controversial when considering its 
ascription to children. I am inclined to think that many people would disapprove 
of the fact that some child has been intransigently forced to sacrifice other 
activities the child favours for some one-way career path, such as becoming 
professional athlete or musician. Does it mean that children have the human right 
of self-determination after all? 
Given our ambiguous feelings about children’s liberty mentioned above, the 
answer might be that children hold this human right only partially. We have, as 
Brennan and Noggle (1998) argue, two very deep convictions which form our 
understanding of children’s moral status: that children can be legitimately 
prevented from doing certain things, and that parents can legitimately exercise 
limited but significant discretion in raising children (Brennan and Noggle 1998: 2-
5). This understanding of children’s moral status is compatible with both our view 
of childhood and the assertation that children partially hold the human right of 
self-determination. 
This partial possession means that the child is ascribed only such liberty 
rights that do not conflict with other rights of children. More precisely, any liberty 
right that conflicts with one or more fundamental rights of children ought not to 
be assigned to children. It follows that children should have only those liberty 
rights which are supported by or compatible with one or more such fundamental 
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rights. In other words, the fundamental rights of children determine which things 
are good (right) and bad (wrong) for children, for they protect their essential 
needs. Such needs are norms embedded in the role of a child pinpointing children’s 
(role-based) desires which ought to be protected by the fundamental rights of 
children. To give an example, I asserted that anyone who lets very young children 
drink alcohol or chew tobacco wrongs them for there is a great chance of poisoning 
(harm). Accordingly, anyone who harms a child by doing so also violates that 
child’s fundamental right not to be harmed. It follows that children should not be 
assigned liberty to drink and eat anything they get their hands on, and the 
justification of this denial is grounded in the child’s fundamental right not to be 
harmed. 
 There is no doubt that each child is different and that there should be some 
degree of flexibility when ascribing liberty rights to children. In many cases, such 
ascriptions depend on parents who possess a limited but significant right to 
discretion in raising children.16 As Brennan and Noggle (1998) argue, the 
relationship between parents’ rights and children’s rights is complex and often 
results in conflicts. One of the most striking conflicts lies in the clash of the 
parent’s right to make choices concerning the child in general and the child’s right 
of self-determination. This conflict emerges from conflicting views of which things 
are good and which bad for children.  
To decide such conflicts, Brennan and Noggle suggest employing the idea 
of threshold rights, developed mainly by J. J. Thomson (1990). Threshold rights, 
on Brennan and Noggle’s account, are rights that can be permissibly infringed 
when they conflict with some stronger right and/or when their infringement 
causes ‘a large enough benefit’. I adopt their solution for the thresholding nature 
of rights explains when parents are justified in ascribing or refusing to ascribe 
liberty rights to children. First of all, it needs to be stressed that nobody can ever 
be justified in infringing the fundamental rights of children, and hence the 
thresholding nature concerns only children’s liberty rights. This implies that any 
liberty right which is compatible with one or more fundamental rights of children 
                                         
16 The state, on the other hand, usually protects children’s fundamental rights, as 
well as regulates the age limits for those liberty rights parents have no power to 
ascribe to their children themselves. 
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is always the stronger right when conflicting with some right(s) of parents. Put 
differently, parents are not justified in rejecting to ascribe such a liberty right to 
children (i.e., in overriding children’s right of self-determination). On the other 
hand, whenever some liberty rights conflict with one or more fundamental rights 
of children, parents are justified in infringing children’s right of self-
determination by denying children these rights. Therefore, the infringement of 
children’s right of self-determination can be only justified if it is supported by at 
least one fundamental right of children.       
 Imagine two children, Joseph and Judith, who both live in the society 
providing free and optional education and grow up in families orientated to a 
family business. Unlike Judith, Joseph is not interested in education and wishes 
to help his parents with the family business as soon as possible. However, his 
parents value education more than anything else and order him to go to school. 
Despite Judith’s desire to study, her parents decide that she will not go to school 
for they are in desperate need of her help in the family business. In both cases, 
the parents have infringed Joseph’s and Judith’s right of self-determination. Yet, 
only Joseph’s parents are justified in overriding it because their right to make 
choices involving Joseph is supported by the fundamental right to education, and 
hence the parent’s hold the stronger right in the conflict. Judith’s parents, on the 
other hand, have the weaker right since it is Judith’s right of self-determination 
that is directly backed up by the fundamental right to education. Thus, Judith’s 
parents violate her right when failing to assign her the liberty right to choose a 
career path.  
 To sum up, we have ambiguous feelings about ascribing certain rights to 
children which originate from our understanding of the condition of childhood. On 
the one hand, we think that children should be provided with liberty, which 
manifests our respect for their individualities and capacity to develop personhood. 
On the other hand, we have a deep conviction that too much liberty can wrong 
children precisely because of their vulnerability, incapacity and innocence. In 
most cases, liberty rights are ascribed to children by their parents holding the 
right to significant deliberation in raising children. In other words, how much 
liberty some child has depends on the amount of liberty the parents are willing to 
give the child. This, as I have argued, does not mean that parents are always 
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justified in depriving children of certain liberty rights. To be justified in overriding 
the child’s right of self-determination in the conflict of rights, the parent’s right 
to deliberation in raising the child must be supported by the child’s one or more 
fundamental rights. Since children’s right of self-determination can be justifiably 
infringed, they hold this right only partially. It follows that all liberty rights, unlike 
the fundamental rights, are threshold rights when it comes to children.  
Considering that liberty rights should be assigned in accordance with the 
fundamental rights which protect and further children’s capacity for virtue 
acquisition, it seems plausible to assume that any ascribed liberty right should 
also lead to the development of some virtues. As stated above, with a greater 
amount of liberty might well come accountability and perhaps moderation. This, 
in turn, might also question some socially constructed limitations preventing 
children from occupying certain roles. With more social roles come also more role-
based rights and duties, that is, more opportunities to develop virtues through 
perfecting such roles are opening up to children.            
 
15. Adults and the fundamental rights of children 
I have argued that children have at least three fundamental rights, the right not 
to be harmed, neglected and abused, the right to be nurtured, cared for and 
loved, and the right to education. I have also argued that children do not hold 
certain rights, namely some role-based rights and some liberty rights, which are 
held by adults (though not necessarily by all adults). In this last section, I explain 
why adults do not possess the fundamental rights of children, which, in turn, 
vindicates Feinberg’s division of rights into three categories (rights held only by 
adults, rights held by both adults and children, and rights held solely by children). 
 The fundamental rights of children, as have been demonstrated, are 
grounded in the condition of childhood and have several functions. They protect 
children’s essential needs, and this protection secures their healthy mental and 
physical development. By securing this development, the rights also protect and 
further children’s capacity for virtue acquisition and thereby make children more 
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virtuous. Since people who have acquired virtues are more likely to find happiness 
throughout their lives, the fundamental rights of children also further their 
happiness.  
Adults do not hold such fundamental rights for they are not in the state of 
childhood anymore. Consider the right not to be harmed, abused and neglected. 
Adults do not hold this fundamental right because it is replaced by other civil and 
criminal rights that protect adults against various forms of ill-treatment (e.g., the 
right not to be assaulted).  
Furthermore, the right to be nurtured, cared for and loved protect needs 
that cease to exist in adulthood. For any adult (except for those with special 
needs) should be able to take care of him/herself, and no adult needs to have the 
right to be loved, since other people’s feelings and emotions must be, presumably, 
deserved in adulthood.  
Finally, the right to education raises difficult questions about higher 
education. Such questions are not the subject of this dissertation, and hence I 
merely propose some answers without justification. Given that one of the main 
functions of education is to transform children into functioning members of the 
society, I believe that there can be drawn a following distinction between children 
and adults in their relation to education: while all children ought to be educated, 
only some adults can be educated. This distinction should clarify why the right to 
education is essential for children not for adults. The state (community), I 
maintain, has the moral duty to provide all its children with education. If the state 
(community) is wealthy enough, then it should also provide adults who are 
interested in higher education or requalification with opportunities to study and 
retrain. Nevertheless, it is public (free) education for all children, not public 
higher education, that must be of primary importance in each and every state.  
 Therefore, the three fundamental rights of children are held solely by 
children, for they protect children’s essential needs derived from the conditions 
of childhood. In adulthood, such essential needs either cease to exist or are 
protected by civil and criminal rights. Thus, Feinberg’s division of rights into three 
categories is correct.   
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The chapter has vindicated three main assumptions: (1) that children’s 
rights (an important instance of a protective right) have the function of virtue 
acquisition, (2) that the virtue-based justification of children’s rights is a 
complement to the Interest Theory, and (3) that there are some rights that should 
not be ascribed to children. In other words, I have argued that the best way to 
approach children’s rights is to endeavour to find out the best balance between 
children’s vulnerability and their liberty, and that this balance can be perhaps 
attained by the virtue-based account which combines the need for protection with 
the idea of development.   
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CHAPTER V. PROMISSORY RIGHTS 
Many people believe that in normal circumstances promises ought to be kept. Put 
differently, they believe that promises impose obligations or duties on those who 
make promises. One common explanation of this belief, which I accept here 
without any further justification, is that people can change their normative 
circumstances, and that promises are amongst the most eminent implements of 
this ability. 
 There are also other explanations of why promises are binding. 
Conventionalism and an expectation theory are the other two best-known 
accounts of promising. According to conventionalism (e.g., Rawls 1955), there is 
the rule-based practice of promising recognised as a social convention or an 
institution. This convention (institution) is both useful and just, and people who 
share it benefit from its existence. Consequently, promises impose duties for 
people have the duty not to ‘free-ride’ on the convention (i.e., to make but not 
keep promises) (Rawls 1971). It follows that without this rule-based practice, 
there would be no duties to keep promises. Expectationalists (MacCormick 1972, 
Scanlon 1990, Thomson 1990), on the other hand, argue that promises ought to be 
kept because they create trust (expectations or beliefs) in promisees, and any 
unjustified promise-breaking wrongs the promisee’s trust.17  
Both explanations face certain problems. Any conventionalist must clarify 
why someone who breaks the premise wrongs the convention instead of the 
promisee, because we have a deep conviction that any unjustified promise-
breaking wrongs, first and foremost, the promisee (Habib 2018). Any 
expectationalist needs to explicate why promisors are held under promissory 
duties even when promisees do not expect them to keep their promises (Shiffrin 
2008). These problems are evaded by accepting the power-based theory of 
promising. As will be illustrated, any unjustified promise-breaking wrongs the 
                                         
17 For a detailed explanation of different approaches towards promising, see, e.g., 
(Shiffrin 2008) and (Habib 2018). 
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promisee, and even though promises do, besides other things, create expectations 
in promisees, promisors have promissory duties regardless of such expectations. 
The main aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the power-right to promise 
and promissory rights make the right-holder more virtuous. I argue that although 
these rights are essentially protective rights, they behave like role-based enabling 
rights when it comes to their function of virtue acquisition. For both the power-
right to promise and promissory rights define (at least partially) what virtues are 
and allow their holders to develop such virtues as well as express them in action. 
It follows that people who hold and exercise these rights can develop virtues, 
namely honesty and fairness, by approximating the heuristic model of virtues. I 
argue that while some people tend to perfect indirectly the roles of a promisor 
and a promisee via perfecting other social roles, others are often forced to the 
direct perfection by two normative consequences which affect the possession of 
the power-right to promise and promissory rights. In either case, the virtues of 
honesty and fairness are developed by perfecting social roles, and this perfection 
is made possible because of the power-right to promise and promissory rights. 
To elaborate this virtue-based justification, I start with an explanation of 
how promissory rights and duties originate from the capacity to change normative 
circumstances. Then, I propose that the practice of promising have more than only 
one function and that the several-functions approach seems to capture the whole 
scope of promising. Those functions also highlight the importance of honesty and 
fairness in promising. Furthermore, I draw a line between correct exercises and 
misuses of the power-right to promise and promissory rights. Any correct exercise, 
I assert, consists in acting in accordance with at least the minimal standards of 
honesty and fairness, and any misuse manifests the failure to reach these minimal 
standards. It follows that we have the moral duty to reach such minimal standards 
whenever we participate in the practice of promising. The final section of this 
chapter explicates the function of virtue acquisition. 
Before that, it should be stressed that I am concerned with the role of a 
promisor only as the holder of the power-right to promise, not as the bearer of 
the promissory duty. There are two reasons for this omission. First, the 
dissertation focuses on rights and their function of virtue acquisition, not on duties 
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(though the two cannot be separated when considering primarily claim-rights). 
Second, the role of a promisor contains the role-based duty to keep promises. This 
implies that people who make promises can use any rights they hold to perform 
their duties, as well as to perfect the role of a promisor (as the duty-bearer). 
Although we do not know what rights each individual promisor holds, the 
development of virtues is explicated by the heuristic model of virtues, provided 
that such individuals strive for perfecting the role of a promisor understood as the 
duty-bearer. The power-right to promise, on the other hand, is ascribed to 
humankind (the natural kind) in accordance with the kind-based desire to be able 
to change the normative landscape. Consequently, the function of virtue 
acquisition seems less obvious and therefore deserves our attention here.     
 
16. The power to change normative circumstances 
People believe that they can change their normative circumstances when 
interacting with others. In principle, these circumstances can be altered by (i) 
creating new rights and duties, (ii) transferring existing rights and duties, and by 
(iii) cancelling existing rights and duties. As explained in Chapter I., the ability to 
create, transfer and annul rights and duties comes from the possession of power-
rights.   
 Therefore, the capacity for changing the normative landscape is the power-
right. One typical example of this power-right is consent. As Shiffrin (2008) points 
out, to give you consent to enter my house, you are granted the right to enter the 
house, meaning that you have obtained a permission to conduct an action which 
you would normally have no right to do. In other words, through the expression of 
the consent, I have changed the normative circumstances of our relationships, for 
this expression has created a new right (your right to enter my house) as well as 
new duties (my duty not to complain about your entering) (Shiffrin 2008). 
 In most cases, people hold the power-right to change normative 
circumstances for it is part of some molecular rights. Consider property rights. 
The fact that I own a laptop allows me to give you my permission to use the laptop 
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(consent). Furthermore, it enables me to make a promise that as soon as my new 
laptop arrives, I give you my old laptop for free. Both consent and promise are 
amongst the most prominent instances of the power-right to change normative 
circumstances. However, there is one important difference between consent and 
promise. Unlike consent providing others with permissions to ϕ, promise obligates 
other people to ϕ (ϕ refers to doing some actions, or refraining from doing some 
actions, or being in certain states). The fact that I gave you my consent to enter 
my house while I am at work does not obligate you to enter the house. Suppose 
now that you promised me to bring some important paperwork from my home to 
the office this afternoon. I gave you the keys (manifesting my consent that you 
can enter the house) and instructions where the paperwork should be found. In 
this case, you are not only permitted to enter the house, you are obligated to go 
there, take the paperwork and bring it to the office. 
 There has been much debate about how promises come into being. Some 
philosophers (e.g., Schneewind 1966, Thomson 1990) argue that there is no 
binding promise unless the promisee receives (understands) and accepts the 
promisor’s offer to change normative circumstances by obligating him/herself to 
keep the promise. Others (e.g., Shiffrin 2008) disagree and claim that the 
prerequisite of acceptance is an excessively demanding condition. Accordingly, 
any offer which is not explicitly rejected succeeds in creating a promissory duty. 
The explanation of why promises impose duties on promisors offered here is 
compatible with both views and can be defined as follows:   
1. X has a power-right to change normative circumstances; thus, X can 
make promises. 
2. X promises Y to , and Y does not reject the promise.18  
3. By promising Y to ϕ, X offers to bind him/herself to Y to ϕ. 
4. By not rejecting the promise, Y gains a promissory right that X ϕ.  
5. Therefore, X is obligated to Y to ϕ, meaning that X has a promissory 
duty to ϕ. 
6. X’s promissory duty is owed to Y; hence it is a directed duty.  
7. Failing to fulfil the directed duty to ϕ, X violates Y’s promissory 
rights. 
                                         
18 Though the definition is compatible with both views of when promises become 
obligatory, I use only the ‘do-not-reject’ views to describe the act of promising here 
for the sake of clarity in my argumentation.  
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8. Thus, given the nature of directed duties, to violate some 
promissory right is to wrong a particular promisee.    
This definition implies that both promissory rights and duties result from the 
power-right to promise. Moreover, it evades the two above-mentioned problems 
which challenge conventionalism and the expectation theory. For any unjustified 
promise-breaking wrongs the promisee since it violates his or her promissory right, 
and so long as the promisee does not explicitly reject the promise, the promissory 
duty is created and exists irrespective of created expectations in promisees.   
 
17. The function(s) of promising 
Most philosophers assume that the practice of promising has only one function, or 
one essential function, which explains and thereby justifies its existence. Joseph 
Raz, for instance, argues that the practice of promising exists because it creates 
special bonds between people, and that people desire to have the ability to create 
such bonds (Raz 1982, 1988). Shiffrin (2008) is more specific and asserts that 
promises are essential to good relationships because they restore equality 
between two parties. David Owens (2006, 2012), to give another example, claims 
that the main function of promising is to satisfy our ‘authority interests’, and that 
the practice of promising exists due to our desire to have the deliberative control 
over the promissory duty of another gained from the possession of promissory 
rights. Furthermore, most expectationalists argue that the essential function of 
promising is to create expectations on which the other party can rely (MacCormick 
1972, Thomson 1990), whereas most conventionalists claim that promising exists 
because it has proved to be the best institutional solution to the human need for 
cooperation and interaction (Rawls 1971). 
 Contrary to the assumption that there is only one, or one essential, function 
of promising, I propose that the practice of promising, like rights, has several more 
or less compatible functions, and that these functions, taken together, explicate 
promising in a less fractured way. However, I do not attempt to justify the several-
functions thesis here. My only task is to list the most apparent functions of 
promising, which, in turn, should help me to highlight the importance of honesty 
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and fairness in the practice of promising. Since I presuppose the several-functions 
approach, I do not need to choose and argue for only one of those possible and 
plausible functions of promising.  
There is no doubt that promises enable us to establish, maintain and re-
establish special moral bonds within our relationships. For promises, as Shiffrin 
(2008) illustrates, restore and secure equality between two parties in such 
relationships. If the parties were unable to make and accept promises, they would 
lack certitudes that some promised states of the world happen in the future. This 
would have unfavourable impacts on their approaches towards the relationship 
itself. Thus, promises are essential to morally valuable and sustainable 
relationships (Shiffrin 2008), and the function of creating and maintaining special 
moral bonds is one of the most important functions of promising. 
Yet, one party cannot have certitudes that some promised state of the 
world will happen unless the party believes that the other party keeps the 
promise. Accordingly, it appears that the whole scope of promising cannot be fully 
captured unless we mention its ability to create expectations. Thomson (1990) 
argues that whenever X makes the offer to bind him/herself to Y to ϕ, X is 
asserting the proposition containing information on X’s willingness to be bound to 
Y to ϕ. In so doing, X invites Y to rely on the truth of the proposition. People, I 
believe, intend to persuade others of the truth of such asserted proposition whilst 
making promises. For any offer to be bound that ϕ is true (i.e., that the promise 
is kept) is meant to provide others with a good reason to believe that some 
promised state of the world is either true in the future, or that the promisor will 
do whatever s/he can to minimise the risk of its untruth. Therefore, creating 
expectations (beliefs or trust) in promisees is another fundamental function of 
promising, which complements the function of creating and maintaining special 
moral bonds. Indeed, we can have hardly morally valuable and sustainable 
relationships without trust. 
Furthermore, some people certainly hunger for authority and hence we can 
assume that such people may accept promises on a regular basis only because of 
their motivation to gain the control over the promissory duty of another. 
Consequently, the practice of promising seems to satisfy our authority interests 
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(Owens 2006, 2012). Such authority interest can be also explained by someone’s 
attempt to secure equality between this person and the other party in their 
relationship. Imagine that Andrew is notorious for his inability to plan and organise 
things. By promising to Judith to go on holiday with her, Judith assumes the role 
of a decider in holiday-relating matters and therefore can start planning and 
organising the holiday. The point is that without the practice of promising, Judith 
would have no certitude that Andrew goes on holiday with her, and the control 
over Andrew’s promissory duty gives her a good reason to invest time and money 
in organising and planning the holiday. It follows that the function of authority 
interests also supports (though not always) the function of creating and 
maintaining good relationships. 
Finally, I believe that the practice of promising exposes, at least partially, 
moral character. As will be argued in the next section, promising expresses 
honesty and fairness, as well as their defects (dishonesty and unfairness) in action. 
There are people who tend to act in accordance with honesty and fairness while 
making and accepting promises. Nevertheless, some people usually fail to reach 
the minimal standards of honesty and fairness when exercising the power-right to 
promise and promissory rights. Such people manifest dishonesty and unfairness. 
Given that both groups of people act in such ways on a regular basis, it seems that 
the practice of promising reveals their character qualities and defects. This 
function of promising is fully compatible with the previous functions. Because 
one’s knowledge of who the other party is constitutes one’s reason to establish, 
maintain or re-establish some special moral bonds with that party, as well as 
creates one’s trust (expectations) when interacting with the party. 
Therefore, the four above-mentioned functions of promising appear to 
complement each other. They also seem to explicate promising in a less fractured 
way than the monistic approach, because one function leads to another. In the 
rest of this chapter, I argue that people have the moral duty to act in accordance 
with honesty and fairness when exercising the power-right to promise and 
promissory rights, and that the possession of these rights often results in the 
development of such virtues.  
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18. Exercising the power-right to promise and promissory rights 
The practice of promising, as suggested in the last section, has at least four 
functions: (1) creating and maintaining moral bounds, (2) creating expectations, 
(3) satisfying authority interests, and (4) revealing moral character. These 
functions, I believe, highlight the importance of honesty and fairness in promising. 
The aim of this section is to demonstrate the fundamental connections between 
the power-right to promise and honesty on the one hand, and promissory rights 
and fairness on the other. More precisely, I argue that any correct exercise of 
these rights consists in reaching at least the minimal standards of honesty and 
fairness, and that any misuse of such rights expresses dishonesty and unfairness. 
 The power-right to promise and promissory rights are protective rights for 
they protect a human desire to hold the capacity for changing the normative 
landscape via promising, and a role-based desire that promisors fulfil their 
promissory duties, respectively. Nevertheless, these rights have also other 
functions, which differ from the four functions of promising. Both the power-right 
to promise and promissory rights provide their holders with discretion. While the 
former gives an option to make promises or not to make promises in order to 
change normative circumstances, the latter enables to waive or enforce the 
performance of the promissory duty.19 Therefore, even though the power-right to 
promise and promissory rights are essentially protective rights, their possession 
resides especially in exercising (i.e., constant choosing whether to make or not 
promises and whether to waive or enforce the performance of the promised 
action).  The power-right to promise and promissory rights also develop virtues, 
as will be argued in the next section. 
 Since the possession of power-right to promise and promissory rights calls 
for exercising, these rights can be exercised either correctly or incorrectly 
(misused). Given the definition of promising offered above, whether or not one 
misuses such rights depends on that person’s intentions of wronging the other 
                                         
19 As Hallie Liberto demonstrates, ‘on any theory a promisee holds the authority to 
determine whether the promisee gets released from the promise’ (Liberto 2017: 
400). 
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party when making promises or exercising the deliberative control over the 
promissory duty. There is some empirical evidence (Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron 
2009, Cimino 2010) showing that someone’s intentions play an important role in 
our evaluation of his or her behaviour in the roles of a promisor and a promisee. 
As Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron (2009) points out, people are ‘highly sensitive to the 
suspicion’ that they have been exploited or taken advantage of. Considering that 
the act of promising resides in offering to be bound that some state of the world 
is true, it seems plausible to assume that people are also sensitive to the suspicion 
that they have been tricked into false (hence unreliable) beliefs. Accordingly, I 
propose that someone misuses the power-right to promise whenever that person 
acts on the intention of tricking the other party into some false, unreliable belief, 
and that any misuse of the promissory right comes from someone’s intention of 
exploiting the other party by assuming and/or exercising the discretionary control 
over the promissory duty of that other party. 
 Such intentions and their subsequent actions express dishonesty (tricking 
others into false beliefs) and unfairness (taking advantage of or exploiting 
vulnerable people). Based on the work of Peterson and Seligman (2004), honesty 
refers to being truthful and sincere while thinking about, judging and treating 
myself as well as others. Accordingly, dishonesty means being untruthful and 
insincere while thinking about, judging and treating myself as well as other 
people. Dishonesty, on my account, is the leading character weakness of people 
who often misuse the power-right to promise. Unfairness or injustice (I take 
fairness to be synonymous with justice here), on the other hand, is the leading 
character weakness of those who tend to misuse their authority gained from the 
possession of promissory rights. As Schmidtz and Thrasher (2014) point out, 
fairness or justice can be understood in two generally different ways as someone’s 
character trait and as a feature of social institutions. To avoid redundant 
complications, I define fairness simply as one getting one’s due. Therefore, being 
fair consists in thinking about, judging and treating others in ways that they get 
their due, and to be unfair means to think about, judge and treat others in ways 
that they do not get their due. 
Consider the formal definition of misusing the power-right to promise first:  
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(1) The promisor’s misuse thesis: X issues an offer to bind him/herself 
to Y that some state of the world, S, is true in the future. In so 
doing, X is convincing Y of the truth of S. However, X   
 
(i) knows at the time of convincing that S will be untrue and/or 
(ii) X does not care about the truth of S (i.e., does not intend to 
do whatever X can to secure the truth of S). 
Imagine David who promises Daisy to meet her in front of his house at eight 
o’clock. Daisy does not reject David’s offer and hence the binding promise is 
created. If David does not intend to meet Daisy at the time of issuing the offer, 
or if he is not sure about meeting her and does not intend to minimise the risk of 
not meeting her, David’s intention is clearly to trick Daisy into thinking that he 
will meet her. Therefore, David expresses dishonesty and thereby misuses his 
power-right to promise. 
(2) The promisee’s misuse thesis: Y has a promissory right and X did 
not misuse the power-right to promise. Y misuses the authority 
gained from the possession of the promissory right when: 
 
(i) X finds out that S (some state of the world) will be untrue, 
even though X has tried hard to bring about the truth of S, or 
true only if some significant harm is caused. X asks, when 
possible, either for a release from the duty or for a 
postponement of the performance of the duty. Yet, Y refuses 
to release X from the duty, or to postpone the performance of 
the duty, or does so only if some disproportionate (unfair) 
compensation is secured. 
 
(ii) X breaks the promise and is not justified in doing so, and 
therefore X violates Y’s promissory right. Y demands some 
disproportionate compensation.  
 
(iii) X makes an overextensive promise and Y does not reject it or 
failing that, does not release X from the promissory duty.  
The concepts of vulnerability and overextensive promises need an explanation. 
Promisors can become vulnerable when, due to some unforeseen circumstances 
and/or unknown incapacities, promised states of the world are either untrue or 
true only if some significant harm is caused. This vulnerability creates the scope 
for unfair treatment. Since promissory rights provide their holder with an option 
to either waive or enforce promissory duties, the possession of such rights enables 
the right-holder to either act in accordance with fairness or to fail to reach the 
minimal standard of fairness.  
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Overextensive promises, the concept developed by Hallie Liberto (2017), 
are promises with content which provides promisees with ‘an obligation to refuse 
the offered promise or failing that, to subsequently release promisors from the 
promissory obligations’ (Liberto 2017: 395). In principle, any content which is 
immoral, or exceedingly burdensome to perform, or of ‘the wrong kind to be 
transferred to another person’s discretionary control’ (Liberto 2017: 397), makes 
a promise overextensive. The last type of content should not be transferred to 
another person’s discretionary control because it ‘involves a commitment to allow 
the promisee to do something physically or emotionally invasive to the promisor’ 
(ibid.: 398). Such promises (e.g., promises to have sex or not to have sex with 
other people or promises to donate organs and to reveal traumatic memories) 
succeed in creating promissory duties. However, Liberto argues that we have a 
moral duty to reject such offers to change the normative landscape or, if the 
offers have been already accepted, to release promisees from their duties as soon 
as possible. 
The upshot of this section is that any correct exercise of the power-right to 
promise and promissory rights must consist in reaching at least the minimal 
standards of honesty and fairness. We seem to be highly sensitive to the suspicion 
that other people have either tricked us or exploited our vulnerability, and we do 
consider such actions to be wrong. They are wrong, as I have argued, because they 
are misuses of the power-right to promise and promissory rights. It follows that 
anyone who exercises these rights has the moral duty to act in accordance with 
honesty and fairness. This duty is assigned to the roles of a promisor (acting in 
accordance with honesty) and a promisee (acting in accordance with fairness), 
and therefore whoever decides to occupy such roles (by making and accepting 
promises in an everyday life) ought to fulfil that duty.  
  
19. The development of honesty and fairness 
The function of virtue acquisition in the case of the power-right to promise and 
promissory rights can be explained by the heuristic model of virtues because of 
the ascription of the above-mentioned duty to the roles of a promisor and a 
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promisee. For this duty-ascription transforms the power-right to promise and 
promissory rights (both protective rights) into role-based enabling rights.  
 To be more precise, the idea of the minimal standard of role-relevant 
behaviour (Chapter III.) implies the gradual evaluative system consisting of four 
general marks: poor (failing to reach the minimal standard), appropriate (the 
minimal standard), well (close to the perfect standard), perfect or excellent (the 
perfect standard). Considering that the roles of a promisor and a promisee contain 
the duty to achieve at least the minimal standards of honesty and fairness, it 
follows that there are other standards and that promisees and promisors can strive 
for approximating better or even perfect standards (the heuristic models of 
honesty and fairness). Both the power-right to promise and promissory rights are 
essential to this approximation, for they make it possible. In other words, people 
can develop honesty and fairness through perfecting the roles of a promisor and a 
promisee, but this perfection is possible only due to the possession of the power-
right to promise and promissory rights. 
 Given that the heuristic model of virtues has been explained in detail 
(Chapter III.), I focus only on one objection to the function of virtue acquisition 
presented in this chapter, and one difference between the roles of a promisee 
and a promisor and other social roles. The most pressing objection is that people 
who tend to misuse the power-right to promise and promissory rights still hold 
these rights even though they constantly fail to reach the minimal standards of 
honesty and fairness. Put differently, such people cannot be deprived of these 
rights in the same way police officers can when they lose their job for the constant 
failure of achieving the minimal standard of role-relevant behaviour. If this is true, 
then the power-right to promise and promissory rights cannot have the function 
of virtue acquisition. The most striking difference lies in the fact that the roles of 
a promisor and a promisee can be perfected indirectly via perfecting other social 
roles. I discuss this difference first and then argue that people who often misuse 
their power-right to promise and promissory rights might be deprived of these 
rights for some time. This deprivation, as will be illustrated, move many people 
to start perfecting the roles of a promisor and a promisee. Therefore, even people 
who do misuse their rights on a regular basis might well be motivated to strive for 
achieving at least the minimal standards of honesty and fairness. 
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Many people who make and accept promises on a daily basis achieve or 
strive to attain at least the minimal standards of honesty and fairness. This does 
mean that they must always succeed in achieving these minimal standards, I only 
point out that they usually do. Their conduct suggests that these people take, for 
whatever reason, honesty and fairness to be important for human relationships 
and interaction, and they seem to think that promising is essential to such 
relationships and interaction. In other words, their moral convictions ascribe the 
duty to act in accordance with honesty and fairness to the roles of a promisor and 
a promisee. It follows that for those people the power-right to promise and 
promissory right functions as role-based enabling rights allowing them to perform 
the role-based duty. 
It should be highlighted that the roles of a promisor and a promisee differ 
from other social roles in one specific aspect: the former often come into being 
within the realm of the latter. Like virtues, promises do not exist in vacuum, for 
they require, first and foremost, our social reality. Put differently, one makes or 
accepts promises either in the role of ____, or, in some rare cases, in the kind of 
a human being, when the other party is some different kind, say, an alien or 
animals. Therefore, in our everyday life the roles of a promisor and a promisee 
come into existence in other social roles. 
This characteristic feature of the roles of a promisor and a promisee implies 
that the power-right to promise and promissory rights permit the perfection of 
these roles through perfecting other social roles. Think of Andrew who makes and 
accepts promises as a husband, father, son, brother, friend, and a colleague on a 
daily basis. Suppose also that he almost always achieves at least the minimal 
standards of honesty and fairness when exercising his power-right to promise and 
promissory rights as a husband, father, etc. Given Andrew’s way of exercising his 
rights, it seems very likely that he interprets the ideal husband, father, etc., as 
models which contain the perfect standards of honesty and fairness, for such role 
models also make and accept promises.20 Consequently, Andrew can perfect the 
roles of a promisor and a promisee by perfecting the roles of a husband, father, 
etc., and such other social roles are perfected, partly, by the possession of the 
                                         
20 Note that the heuristic model cannot be detached from our ability to change 
normative circumstances if it is to serve as the model of virtues. 
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power-right to promise and promissory rights. Put differently, Andrew does not 
need to be directly motivated to perfect the roles of a promisor and a promisee 
in order to cultivate honesty and fairness by exercising his rights. For so long as 
Andrew strives to become a good (or excellent) husband, father, etc., he will 
eventually acquire better standards of honesty and fairness because he makes and 
accepts promises daily whilst occupying these roles. 
Moreover, the way someone exercises the power-right to promise and 
promissory rights reveals the possession of either honesty and fairness or their 
defects. People who have reached the perfect (ideal) standard of honesty will be 
presumably more cautious about exercising their power-right to change normative 
circumstances than those who hardly manage to achieve the expected minimal 
standard. On the other hand, people who have fully or almost completely 
cultivated fairness will arguably never face an option to misuse their authority, 
because any unfair treatment of other people never even crosses their minds. 
There would be no scope for the expression of such virtues and their defects in 
action if people did not hold the power-right to promise and promissory rights 
providing them with deliberation.  
Finally, since virtues can be manifested not only in role-relevant situations 
but also in virtue-relevant situations, it seems plausible to assume that people 
who usually act in accordance with honesty and fairness while making and 
accepting promises in certain roles (as a father, husband, etc.), will most likely 
become honest and fair whenever some situation calls for these virtues. Thus, on 
condition that people believe that they have a moral duty to act in accordance 
with honesty and fairness whilst changing their normative circumstances via the 
practice of promising, there is a high probability that the possession of the power-
right to promise and promissory rights results in the development of honesty and 
fairness. 
However, there are without doubt people who either do not believe that 
they have such a moral duty or often fail to fulfil that duty when participating in 
promising. These people misuse the power-right to promise and promissory rights 
on a regular basis, but they seem to possess such rights irrespective of this 
constant misusing. How can the possession of those rights lead to the development 
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of honesty and fairness in this case? Such people are clearly uninterested in 
perfecting either the roles of a promisor and a promisee or other social roles via 
ameliorating the roles of a promisor and a promisee. The answer resides in the 
fact that any regular misuse of the power-right to promise and promissory rights 
seems to have two severe normative consequences many people wish to avoid: (1) 
promisors become untrustworthy and (2) promisees earn a bad social reputation 
of individuals who take advantage of or exploit vulnerable people. I believe and 
am about to illustrate that most people do not want to face these consequences 
because they seriously affect the (general) capacity for changing normative 
circumstances.  
Consider, firstly, the promisor’s regular misuses making his or her 
untrustworthy for others. As Scanlon’s (1990) Profligate Pal case demonstrates, 
any repetitive misuse of the power-right to promise affects the possession of that 
right. The Pal, as Scanlon pictures, has been borrowing money from people for 
years, promising to pay the money back and never doing so. Not only does the 
Pal’s misusing ends in people’s increasing unwillingness to lend him any money, it 
also results in his decreasing capacity to convince others of his intentions. After 
some time, people who know the Pal will stop believing his words. It means that 
any promise the Pal makes fails to deliver the ‘message’ including information on 
his intention to be bound to keep the promise, and therefore the Pal appears to 
be deprived of his power-right to promise. 
 Moreover, if others cease to believe his words that some promised states 
of the world will be true, they may well start taking all his assertions and 
affirmations with a pinch of salt. Why would he fulfil newly created duties 
originating from his consent to enter his house if he does not even attempt to 
perform his promissory duties? In other words, the Pal’s general capacity to change 
normative circumstances by other power-rights, such as the power-rights to 
express consent or to take an oath, seems to be (at least) weakened too. 
 The consequence of the Pal’s regular misuses has also direct impacts on his 
relationships and interactions with other people. I believe that the Pal will sooner 
or later start feeling the effects of his misusing, and such effects compel him to 
strive for restoring trust in order to regain the possession of the power-right to 
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promise and/or the general capacity to change normative circumstances. How can 
he inform us about his intents and feelings if the line between truth and lie is 
blurred? How can the Pal assure us that his statements about what he did or has 
done are true? This inability has without doubt many unpleasant practical 
consequences for the Pal’s everyday life in the society. For it affects the Pal’s 
capacity for establishing and maintaining morally valuable and sustainable 
relationships with others, and Aesop’s fable on the boy who cried wolf is an 
evidence that people have been aware of such consequences for centuries. 
 Accordingly, I am inclined to think that most promisors who have in fact 
become untrustworthy like the Pal will eventually get motivated to restore trust. 
The main reason for doing so is to regain the possession of the power-right to 
promise or other powers derived from the capacity for changing normative 
circumstances. The only way how to restore the trust is to morally rehabilitate, 
that is, to prove to be trustworthy again. Such promisors must start expressing 
honesty in action (at least at the minimal-standard level) regularly, and they ought 
to keep doing so for a long time. In other words, the Pal should express honesty 
whenever he exercises the power-right to promise in as many roles he occupies as 
possible. Consequently, there seems to be a good chance of the habituation of 
honesty, for the Pal repeats practising the goal-relevant quality and, as Snow 
points out, ‘[t]he repeated performance of such actions results in habits of 
virtuous behaviour, which build up virtuous dispositions over time’ (Snow 2016: 
140). 
 In addition, we might assume that after some time of practising honesty, 
the Pal’s character changes because it cultivates some standard of honesty. 
Although this quality is not fully developed, it can affect his interpretation of 
duties and activities that come with the role of a promisor as well as with other 
social roles he occupies. Put differently, the Pal can eventually get motivated to 
strive for some better standards of honesty. 
 Promisees, on the other hand, who often misuse their promissory rights 
earn a bad social reputation of individuals who exploit vulnerable people. This 
affects one’s ability to receive and accept promises, because people will attempt 
to avoid making promises to that person. For they do not wish to take any risk of 
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becoming vulnerable in their relationships with that individual. Obviously, some 
people will be always forced to enter into promissory relationships with that 
person due to their social roles, but this does not undermine the fact that X’s 
willingness to offer to be bound to Y that  is directly proportional to Y’s 
reputation of misusing the discretionary control gained from the possession of 
promissory rights. Consequently, any regular misuse of promissory rights also 
threatens the possession of such rights. 
 There are two main reasons why I believe that most promisees who have 
earned the bad reputation get motivated to improve their reputation through the 
moral rehabilitation. First, as Shiffrin (2008) points out, promises are the pivotal 
instrument for restoring equality between two parties in relationships. If people 
cease making promises to me, I may start feeling unsecure because of my 
decreasing ability to restore the equality in my relationships. Recall the example 
of Andrew and Judith who plan to go on holiday together. Since Andrew is 
notorious for his inability to plan things, Judith assumes the discretionary control 
over Andrew’s promissory duty to go on the holiday, so that she can start investing 
her time and money in planning the holiday. If Andrew had known that Judith 
exploits vulnerable people whenever the opportunity presents itself, he would 
have thought twice before promising to go on the holiday. Second, as Owens 
(2006, 2012) argues, many people have, at least to some degree, authority 
interests. Considering that the acceptance of someone’s promise is one of the 
easiest ways to obtain authority, we might get motivated to regain the possession 
of promissory rights when we have weakened it by our constant misusing of such 
rights.  
To improve one’s bad reputation depicting that individual as someone who 
exploits or takes advantage of vulnerable people, that person must also start 
expressing the virtue, namely the virtue of fairness, (at least at the minimal-
standard level) on a regular basis for a long time. Therefore, even promisees who 
do not believe that they have a moral duty to act in accordance with fairness 
whilst exercising their promissory rights will eventually face the need for the 
moral rehabilitation, because that is the only way to regain the possession of 
promissory rights and the authority that comes from this possession. 
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To conclude, the possession of the power-right to promise and promissory 
rights results in the development of honesty and fairness in many (perhaps most) 
cases. This development is explained by the heuristic model of virtues, for the 
power-right to promise and promissory rights, which are primarily protective 
rights, behave like role-based enabling rights allowing their holders to perform 
the role-based duty to act in accordance with honesty and fairness. Many people, 
as has been illustrated, endeavour to achieve at least the minimal standards of 
honesty and fairness whilst making and accepting promises because they believe 
to be held under the (role-based) moral duty to do so. Such people will eventually 
improve these standards, for they are motivated (either directly or indirectly) to 
perfect the roles of a promisor and a promisee. On the other hand, people who 
tend to misuse their power-right to promise and promissory rights will sooner or 
later face certain normative consequences which force them to reconsider their 
behaviour. I have argued that these consequences come with the decreasing 
ability to change normative circumstances as a result of one’s regular misuse of 
the power-right to promise and promissory rights. Most people who actually 
become untrustworthy or earn the reputation of people who exploit vulnerable 
people get motivated to morally rehabilitate in order to regain their possession of 
the power-right to promise and promissory rights. In other words, they start to 
perfect the roles of a promisor and a promisee.       
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate whether virtue ethics can provide 
the normative background for the justification of rights. Based on Wenar’s Kind-
Desire Theory and Snow’s Minimal Virtue of the Folks, I could start researching 
into new, alternative and unexplored ways to justify many rights-ascriptions. 
 I have argued that rights have a plurality of functions and that one of these 
functions is to make the right-holder more virtuous. To demonstrate this, I have 
concentrated on role-based enabling rights, allowing their holders to perform role-
based duties and activities, and protective rights, which protect role/kind-based 
desires that certain duties and activities are carried out by others. Enabling rights 
make up most role-based rights people held due to their occupations of social 
roles. These rights, I have argued, have the function of virtue acquisition because 
they allow the right-holder to strive for approximating ideal role models that 
define what virtues are and how such virtues should be expressed in action. 
Regarding protective rights, it has been shown that the possession of some 
protective rights, namely the power-right to promise and promissory rights, results 
in the development of virtues in the same way as in the case of enabling rights. 
Other protective rights, especially children’s rights, develop virtues by protecting 
the right-holder’s essential needs, for their protective function also protects and 
furthers the right-holder’s capacity for virtue acquisition. 
 I do not claim that these are the only ways how the possession of rights can 
lead to the development of virtues. Considering that I have been concerned 
primarily with (molecular) claim-rights and the power-right to promise, there 
might well be other ways when it comes to other types of rights, such as (pure) 
immunity-rights, single-privilege rights and other power-rights. This eventuality 
calls for further research into the relationship between virtues and rights. I believe 
that my work has demonstrated that such connections are not only possible, but 
also stimulating. For the virtue-based justification of rights does not ascribe rights 
in order to provide people with liberty (choices) or to protect their interests, as 
argued by Will and Interest theorists, it assigns rights so that people can develop 
themselves through cultivating and acquiring more and more traits, qualities and 
skills. I do not deny that rights also provide people with liberty and protect their 
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interests. After all, rights have several functions, not only the function of virtue 
acquisition. I simply assert that the dissertation has succeeded in finding the 
justification of rights, according to which many (perhaps all) rights exist to permit 
the personal growth, that is, to make us better people in general. Therefore, I 
sincerely hope that other scholars researching into rights will cease to overlook 
virtue ethics whilst searching for the justification of rights. 
 There is one final remark to be made. I believe that the virtue-based 
justification of rights may have some impact on the field of artificial intelligence. 
Recently, a robot named ‘Sophia’ was granted a full citizenship in Saudi Arabia, 
which comes with many civic rights Sophia now holds. It is only a matter of time 
until the questions about rights-ascriptions to AI and their justification play an 
important role in our lives. Given that enabling rights exist to allow their holders 
to perform their duties and other tasks, there is no doubt that AI will sooner or 
later be ascribed this type of a right, for the AI will be assigned duties and tasks 
to be carried out. The question is whether the possession of an enabling right can 
lead to the ‘personal growth’ also in the case of AI. I am inclined to think that 
when AI is able to learn, it can also learn to perform its duties and tasks in a better 
way. Even though we might refuse to talk about the moral development here, we 
cannot deny the development of AI’s skills.  
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